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 The study of Byzantine diplomacy often focuses upon the empire at the height of 
its power and influence, when emperors and their extensive bureaucracies could use their 
vast resources to neutralize any opponents.
1
 Even after the sack of Constantinople and the 
empire’s reconstitution in 1261, such Byzantine emperors as Michael VIII Palaiologos 
used the state’s legacy and resources to their advantage in diplomatic negotiations.
2
 
However, the later period of Byzantine diplomacy and foreign policy, especially under 
the final emperor, Constantine XI Palaiologos, has received less attention. In fact, each of 
the major works detailing Constantine’s life places very little emphasis upon his 
diplomatic activities. Instead, scholarship of Byzantium’s final years portrays the 
emperor and his advisors as merely victims of the events surrounding Constantinople’s 
fall. Therefore, this thesis will show how Constantine XI and his court created foreign 
policy toward other powers, particularly the Ottoman Empire, the Papacy, and the 
Venetian Republic, centering on the imperial administration’s use of personal diplomacy. 
When the emperor and his councilors had access to the expertise of foreigners, they were 
able to create cohesive, effective policies toward other states. However, when the Greeks 
did not have access to foreign elites who could both advise the court and intercede on 
their behalf within their respective states, Byzantine foreign policy faltered. 
                                                
1
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2 
Each of the three main works on Constantine XI Palaiologos’ life overlooks his 
diplomatic practices and his administration’s construction of foreign policy. Chedomil 
Mijatovich, author of Constantine Palaeologus (1448 – 1453) or The Conquest of 
Constantinople by the Turks, wrote his analysis of the final Byzantine emperor with a 
very specific intention. In 1892, when Mijatovich authored his work, tensions between 
the fledgling Kingdom of Greece and the Ottoman Empire were rising, and war appeared 
to be a likely possibility. Therefore, Mijatovich, who was sympathetic to Greek interests, 
wrote his biography of Constantine XI as a form of propaganda to build support for the 
Greek cause. In fact, the diplomat even dedicates his work to the young Prince 
Constantine, who was the heir to the Greek throne. The author explains in his preface that 
“Constantinople may soon again change masters,” alluding to the possibility of the Greek 
nation re-conquering the Ottoman capital city.
3
 As a result of these motives, Constantine 
XI is portrayed as a tragic victim of the events around him. Mijatovich even describes 
him as such: “Constantine Draga  was in fact rather a simple, honest soldier than a 
skillful diplomatist.”
4
 Since he wanted to maintain an image of Greek helplessness to 
motivate his contemporary readers, Mijatovich only cursorily examines the reasons 
behind Constantine’s actions and their effects upon the fall of Constantinople in 1453. As 
a result, Mijatovich’s biography neither analyzes the emperor’s diplomatic relations nor 
discusses the development of Byzantine foreign policy during his reign. 
 Sir Steven Runciman’s The Fall of Constantinople 1453 follows the Serbian 
diplomat’s example by characterizing Constantine through the siege of Constantinople. 
The British historian used this tactic before as he characterized Emperor Michael VIII by 
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3 
analyzing his participation in the “Sicilian Vespers” of the thirteenth century. Unlike 
Chedomil Mijatovich, Runciman was not interested in creating a work of propaganda 
intended to spur Greek nationalism. However, Runciman’s narrative does portray the 
emperor primarily as a tragic figure through detailed descriptions of his diplomatic efforts 
to save the empire from destruction. His account does not dismiss Constantine XI’s 
responsibility for antagonizing the Turks, eventually leading to their assault upon 
Constantinople. He states: “The emperor himself was to blame for a worsening of the 
relations between the empire and the Turks.”
5
 Like Mijatovich’s monograph, Runciman 
is not concerned with the historical background of the emperor’s decisions, but merely 
that they were a part of his larger story involving the fall of Constantinople. 
 The most recent analysis of Constantine XI, Donald Nicol’s The Immortal 
Emperor, departs from the previous works’ structures. Instead of characterizing the 
emperor through the lens of the siege of Constantinople in 1453, Nicol highlights some 
themes and trends that appear throughout Constantine’s life. Using source material from 
Constantine’s reign as despot of the Morea before his accession to the imperial throne, 
Nicol thoroughly analyzes the various trials that the last Byzantine emperor faced. 
However, like the other accounts, his work does not explain how Emperor Constantine 
XI and his court formulated foreign policy actions while attempting to end the Ottoman 
threat to Constantinople. Nicol places less emphasis upon the impact that individuals, 
aside from the emperor, had on Byzantine policy during this period. 
 This thesis intends to help fill a gap in the scholarship of Byzantine Emperor 
Constantine XI Palaiologos. The major works on the last emperor do not focus upon the 
creation of diplomatic discourse or foreign policy during his reign. Each of them uses the 
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4 
events surrounding the end of Byzantium for different purposes. Mijatovich uses them for 
propaganda, Runciman weaves them into an engaging narrative detailing 
Constantinople’s fall, and Nicol places them into the context of the emperor’s life in 
general. None of them analyzes or acknowledges the importance that personal diplomacy 
played in Byzantium under Constantine XI. In addition, the three works overlook the 
successes that the imperial administration had during this period because of that personal 
diplomacy. Therefore, this thesis will examine the events surrounding Constantinople’s 
fall through their implications on diplomacy and foreign policy during the last emperor’s 
reign. 
 Before examining these issues, it is important to place Constantine’s empire into 
its historical context. By the fifteenth century, Byzantium had been reduced to only a 
fraction of its former grandeur. The major catalyst of this decline came during the 
eleventh century. After Emperor Romanos IV Diogenes failed to prevent the Seljuk 
Turks’ entry into Byzantine territory in the Battle of Manzikert in 1071, much of Asia 
Minor and all of the eastern provinces were quickly lost to the empire.
6
 While subsequent 
emperors, such as Alexios I Komnenos and Manuel I Komnenos, were able to recover 
some of these lost territories as a result of Western crusades, these gains were only 
temporary. The Turks had permanently settled in Anatolia. As a result, Byzantium lost 
access to its most fertile, wealthy, and populated region, throwing the empire into a sharp 
economic decline, especially in the late twelfth century.
7
 
 This economic turmoil also led to political troubles during this period. The end of 
the Komnenos’ imperial dynasty led to quarrels between the Byzantine aristocratic 
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families seeking to control the throne, while they simultaneously consolidated their 
economic holdings throughout the empire. Often these quarrels degenerated into civil 
war, further destabilizing the political situation in Byzantium. Even when the Angelos 
family prevailed and took the imperial throne, disputes within that clan led to further 
instability. In fact, a disgruntled member of the Angelos family approached the Frankish 
and Venetian military forces at Zara along the Adriatic coast in 1203, asking for 
assistance in claiming the Byzantine throne.
8
 These political intrigues led to the 
impromptu capture and sack of Constantinople during the Fourth Crusade in 1204. 
 The establishment of a Latin Empire in the Aegean following the sack of 
Constantinople also significantly handicapped Byzantium, even though the Greeks were 
able to re-conquer much of their former empire in less than sixty years. The government-
in-exile, based in Nicaea across the Aegean Sea from Constantinople, slowly pushed the 
Latins from Thrace and the southern Morea, forcing them into Thessaly and Attica. 
Under the leadership of Michael Palaiologos, the Byzantines recaptured Constantinople 
in 1261 and began to consolidate their position. The now-Emperor Michael VIII 
Palaiologos deftly defended the empire from the Western Christians, eager to retake 
Constantinople and rebuild the Latin Empire, throughout his reign.
9
 However, his focus 
on the Latins gave the Turks the opportunity to expand into the rest of Asia Minor, taking 
the remainder by the beginning of the fourteenth century, with a few exceptions.
10
 After 
Michael VIII and his immediate successors, the empire suffered more periods of civil war 
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6 
between rival claimants to the throne. While the Palaiologan dynasty was eventually 
victorious in the late fourteenth century, the damage to the empire was irreversible. The 
rival claimants had relied extensively upon Turkish mercenaries to fight their battles, and 
these soldiers refused to return to Anatolia after their service. In addition, the Ottomans 
took advantage of Byzantine political chaos to establish a permanent foothold in Europe 
at Gallipoli. By the fifteenth century, the Ottomans had reduced the Byzantine Empire to 
a strip of land along the Black Sea, the Morea, and the imperial capital of Constantinople. 
While the emperors tried to exert their independence from the Ottoman sultan at every 
opportunity, they were forced into servitude, functioning as his vassals. This was the 
situation that Emperor Constantine XI Palaiologos entered upon his accession in 1448. 
Constantine Palaiologos was born on February 8, 1405 to Emperor Manuel II 
Palaiologos and Serbian princess Helena Draga , their fourth son.
11
 Constantine was 
raised in Constantinople and remained there alongside his father Manuel and his elder 
brother John, witnessing the failed Ottoman siege of 1422. The young Constantine, only 
eighteen years old, so impressed his father and brother during the siege that he was 
chosen to serve as regent during co-Emperor John VIII’s journey to Hungary, seeking aid 
for Byzantium in late 1423.
12
 After his successful regency, Constantine was awarded a 
small strip of territory in Constantinople’s hinterland, extending from the port of 
Mesembria in the north to the port of Selymbria to the west of the capital. While small, 
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this fief was strategically important since it covered the land approaches to 
Constantinople, proving that both his father and elder brother trusted his abilities.
13
 
 While the son of the philosopher-Emperor Manuel II, a prolific writer and 
theologian, Constantine did not share his father’s deep interest in scholarship and 
learning. Scholars in the service of Manuel II tutored Constantine in the Byzantine capital 
until he was seventeen years old, but he was more interested in hunting and the martial 
arts. He was praised for his marksmanship, hunting prowess, and martial abilities as a 
child.
14
 Constantine had no interest in theology or philosophy, but he did patronize 
philosophers and other scholars.
15
 For instance, he was close friends with the renowned 
scholar George Gemistos Plethon, and bestowed honors upon him while despot of the 
Morea.
16
 Constantine showed the same proclivities when an adult as he did as a child. He 
was much more comfortable riding into battle than debating philosophy or negotiating 
trade agreements with foreign ambassadors.
17
 Nonetheless, he was a prudent man, and 
heeded his councilors advice on important matters of state. He was also a competent 
administrator, following his father’s advice while serving as regent in Constantinople in 
1423, and learning from his tenure ruling various fiefs around the empire.
18
 As a result of 
these experiences, Constantine was well prepared for the imperial throne upon his 
accession in 1449. 
After Manuel II’s death in 1425, John VIII offered his younger brother 
Constantine a new fief in the northwest Morea, where he would be charged with re-
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conquering the region from its Latin overlords. Upon their arrival, John and Constantine 
utterly defeated the Latin ruler of Epiros, Carlo Tocco.
19
 In order to save his dignity, he 
offered his daughter Maddalena to Constantine in marriage, providing several Moreote 
ports and villages as her dowry. Unfortunately, she died childless less than eighteen 
months later.
20
 Constantine proceeded to conquer various territories throughout the 
Morea, culminating in the capture of the major city of Patras in 1429. Constantine’s 
successes, and Emperor John VIII’s obvious preference for his talented younger brother 
as his successor (John had no children), angered his other brothers. This was especially 
true of Manuel’s second son Theodore, co-despot of the Morea based at Mistra, who was 
extremely jealous of Constantine’s ability and popularity.
21
 At the request of his mother 
Helena, Constantine was chosen to serve as regent in Constantinople again during John 
VIII’s trip to Italy for the Council of Florence in 1437.
22
 Constantine was clearly her 
favorite son, and she actively advocated that he be chosen as John’s successor. When 
John returned from Italy in 1440, Constantine traveled back to the Morea, where he first 
arranged to marry the daughter of the Genoese lord of Mytilene, Caterina. However, this 




 Once Constantine returned to the Morea, he focused upon its defense from 
Turkish invasions, and planned his next wars of expansion against the Ottoman-
controlled principalities to the north, centered on Athens. He knew that the successful 
conclusion of the Council of Florence in 1439 meant that the pope was organizing 
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another crusade to help the Greeks, and planned to take full advantage of it.
24
 Constantine 
refortified the Isthmus of Corinth, and prepared to invade the Latin principalities of 
Athens and Thebes, technically under the suzerainty of the Ottoman sultan. Once 
Constantine heard that the crusade had left Hungary in 1444, he quickly invaded and 
occupied the two cities. However, the crusade’s destruction at Varna later that year meant 
Constantine’s gains would be short lived. In 1446, Sultan Murad II marched against 
Constantine’s isthmian fortifications, the Hexamilion wall, and smashed them. He also 
advanced into the Morea and ravaged it before withdrawing back into Greece.
25
 
Constantine spent the remainder of his time rebuilding the Morea, eventually being 
informed of his brother’s death and was proclaimed Roman emperor, the eleventh of the 
name Constantine, in the palace at Mistra in November 1448. 
 Constantine arrived in Constantinople in early 1449, and after a brief succession 
struggle with his younger brothers Thomas and Demetrios, was acclaimed emperor by the 
Constantinopolitans. His mother Helena was instrumental in securing Constantine’s 
accession over his other brothers.
26
 Forgoing a traditional coronation, the emperor 
immediately focused upon the immediate threat posed by the Ottomans toward 
Constantinople, seeking aid from the various western principalities. He delicately handled 
Byzantine relations with the Papacy by implementing convenient portions of church 
union, and actively courted Venetian support for the city’s defense. While Constantine 
succeeded in gaining some support from the west, he and his advisors misjudged the 
determination of the new Ottoman sultan, Mehmed II, upon his accession in 1451. Soon 
after taking the throne, young Mehmed invested Constantinople with a vast army and 
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fleet. After a brief but intense siege, the Ottomans succeeded in storming and capturing 
the Byzantine capital on May 29, 1453. Emperor Constantine XI was killed fighting at 
the walls, and the Byzantine Empire came to an end. 
The Byzantine capital’s status in the fifteenth century under Emperor Constantine 
XI is also important for understanding Greek diplomacy during this period. 
Constantinople had drastically changed since its sack by Latin crusaders in 1204. The 
Western army had destroyed much of the city’s former glory during the Fourth Crusade, 
both by fire and greed.
27
 As a result, the city became a “ruralized network of scattered 
nuclei” by the fifteenth century.
28
 The mass exodus from the city under Latin rule left 
wide spaces between groups of settlements inside Constantinople. The city consisted of 
groups of workshops and stores with residential districts and other buildings around a 
shared court, essentially individual villages within its walls.
29
 As a result, the city’s 
traditional civic center near the Acropolis fell into decay. The Great Palace, home of 
Byzantine emperors since before the time of Justinian, fell into disrepair and was 
abandoned, especially after crusaders stripped the roof of its lead and exposed its interior 
to the elements.
30
 Many of the city’s palaces, churches, and other public buildings were 
in a similar ruinous condition by the mid-fifteenth century. 
 However, some sections of Constantinople did prosper during this period. While 
the traditional sections of Constantinople were in decline by the fifteenth century, several 
merchant sections around the Golden Horn still prospered. The Western traveler Clavijo, 
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visiting Constantinople around 1403, marveled at the prosperity of these quarters amid 
the ruin and desolation surrounding them.
31
 Clavijo noted that the Venetian commercial 
district, situated along the shore of the Golden Horn, the Genoese suburb-colony of 
Galata, across the Golden Horn from the city proper, and the immediate area around the 
Byzantine imperial residence along the city walls, the Blachernae Palace, still thrived. 
The Italian sectors prospered because they were free from taxation, as emperors of the 
Palaiologan dynasty guaranteed their privileges in Constantinople, beginning with 
Michael VIII and the Genoese after the Greeks recaptured the city in 1261.
32
 The area 
surrounding the Blachernae Palace flourished because it served as the new civic center of 
Constantinople. Since the emperor needed to remain near the land walls in case of attack 
or other crises, this palace became his primary residence. As a result, many Greek nobles 
and courtiers shifted their residences to the Blachernae section. This prompted a small but 
vigorous commercial district which supplied the imperial court and Greek elites with 
wares and supplies. Each of these prosperous areas starkly contrasted with the ruined 
churches, hamlets, and vast grain fields and orchards inside Constantinople’s city walls. 
 The trends in the city’s population followed the trends of its infrastructure in the 
fifteenth century. Even though Constantinople’s population had significantly decreased 
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during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, the city retained a diverse citizenry until 
the empire’s collapse in 1453. The Black Death of 1347 killed nearly one-third of the 
city’s population, which had already been shrinking as a result of the Latin occupation 
and Byzantine civil wars.
33
 The citizenry had barely begun to recover from this outbreak 
when disease attacked the population again. Another outbreak in 1409 and 1410 killed 




 Constantinople’s citizenry consisted of several distinct groups by the mid fifteenth 
century. Even though many Greeks fled the capital amidst the turmoil of the fourteenth 
century, they remained a majority of Constantinople’s residents during Constantine’s 
reign. While the Greek exodus continued, a significant portion of the population was 
comprised of skilled craftsmen and artisans, as well as their families.
35
 Emperors Manuel 
II and John VIII actively courted these skilled workers, as their expertise was needed to 
repair Constantinople’s extensive defenses in the face of the Turkish threat. As a result, 
the Byzantines retained skilled masons for the land walls, and experts that could fortify 
and renew the city’s ports and quays.
36
 In addition, several Greek monastic orders 
established themselves near the Acropolis along the Sea of Marmara.
37
 These monks 
sought the relative safety provided by Constantinople’s walls, as several monastic 
communities outside the city fell under Turkish control in the fourteenth and early 
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fifteenth centuries, most notably the center of Mount Athos. Aside from these skilled 
craftsmen and monastic communities, Greeks engaged in subsistence agriculture within 
the city walls, cultivating small fields and tending to modest orchards in the abandoned 
areas between the land walls and Hagia Sophia. These farmers grew enough to feed their 
families, but could not supply the needs of the entire city. This would become a major 
problem during the Ottoman siege in 1453. 
 The next largest groups living within Constantinople were Italians primarily from 
Genoa and Venice. Most of these residents were merchants, taking advantage of the 
lucrative trade routes leading through the Aegean and Black Seas into Asia. Both groups 
used the city as a waypoint between Italy and their major interests in the Black Sea: Caffa 
for Genoa and Trebizond for the Venetians.
38
 In addition to these merchants, a large 
number of metalworkers lived in the city, primarily engaged in the manufacture of 
personnel armor and weaponry, since the Byzantines constantly needed war materiel.
39
 
While the Venetians in Constantinople came largely without their families, the Italians in 
the Genoese colony of Galata often brought their wives and children.
40
 This would often 
lead to a difference of opinion over strategy during Constantinople’s defense in 1453, as 
the Venetians often advocated a more aggressive stance than the Genoese, who were 
reluctant to risk the safety of their families. These Italians often allowed their conflicts in 
Italy to spill over into Constantinople as well. The emperor was constantly forced to 
dispel tensions and rivalries between the groups to maintain a tenuous peace within the 
                                                
38
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 While often troublesome, the Italians of Venice and Genoa were a sizeable 
presence in Constantinople during the mid-fifteenth century. 
 In addition, the Turks maintained a small presence in the city. An active Turkish 
merchant population settled around the Adrianople Gate, trading between Constantinople 
and the Ottoman capital beginning in the late fourteenth century.
42
 This population 
eventually became so prominent that Ottoman Sultan Bayazid forced Emperor Manuel II 
to establish a Turkish quarter in the city, where the Muslims would be subject to their 
own kadi (judge), and immune from many Byzantine customs duties.
43
 However, these 
merchants were not long-term residents of the city. They often stayed only long enough 
to complete their transactions with the Greeks and Italians in their respective quarters. 
This transient Turkish population existed within Constantinople even during Constantine 
XI’s reign. Doukas explains that the emperor arrested them after an Ottoman massacre of 
Greek farmers outside the city walls, but they were eventually released.
44
 The emperor 
reluctantly ordered their execution in retribution for the capture and execution of several 
Italian ships’ crews during the city’s siege.
45
  
Several contenders to the Ottoman throne also resided in the Byzantine capital 
during the fifteenth century. For example, Emperor Manuel II sheltered the pretender 
Mustafa at the behest of Mehmed I, who wanted to keep the Turkish prince away from 
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Ottoman territory, but close enough to supervise.
46
 During Constantine XI’s reign, the 
Byzantines maintained Orhan, a grandson of the Sultan Suleiman, as well as his 
considerable retinue.
47
 These pretenders were potentially great assets for Byzantine 
emperors in their negotiations with the Ottomans, as they could threaten to release the 
pretenders and ignite civil war among the Turks. While the Byzantine threat to release 
Orhan and spark civil war did not succeed, the prince and his retinue assisted with the 
defense of Constantinople in 1453. 
 Constantinople also possessed a small Jewish population in the fifteenth century. 
Many immigrated to the city as a result of the declining urban landscape throughout the 
rest of Greece, traveling to Constantinople looking for mercantile opportunities. While 
the majority of immigrants were Greek-speaking Jews, a significant section came from 
the Italian merchant republics as well.
48
 As a result, many of these Jews resided in the 
three main commercial districts, along the Golden Horn, in Galata, and in the imperial 
quarter near the Blachernae Palace.
49
 Most chose to do business in the Venetian quarter, 
because they enjoyed an exemption from taxes there. However, this led to resentment 
among the Byzantines, who viewed these Jews as agents undermining their authority 
within Constantinople.
50
 Nonetheless, they remained within the city throughout 
Constantine XI’s reign, as well as during Ottoman rule. 
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As a result of the previously mentioned events, the Byzantine Empire had been 
whittled down to Constantinople, ruled by Constantine XI and the Morea, under his 
feuding brothers. Therefore, the emperor’s diplomatic resources were sorely depleted. 
This work intends to explore the imperial administration’s methods of diplomatic 
exchange during the Byzantine Empire’s final four years of existence. Specifically, it will 
ascertain how Constantine and his court adapted to these conditions in the face of an 
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impending Ottoman assault upon Constantinople, and the efficacy of personal diplomacy 
on Byzantine foreign policy. 
Emperor Constantine XI Palaiologos’ diplomatic relations with other powers 
depended heavily upon his personal relationships with foreign elites and dignitaries. He 
developed these throughout his tenure as despot of the Morea and while Roman emperor. 
He relied upon these relationships, rather than upon bureaucratic channels, because the 
Byzantine bureaucracy deteriorated along with the state. The emperor also relied heavily 
upon the personal relationships between members of his court and foreigners within the 
imperial capital. When Constantine and his court possessed direct, personal relationships 
with influential foreigners, relations with their home states improved. In addition, the 
Byzantines created streamlined, coherent foreign policies toward those states. When the 
emperor or his court did not possess significant personal relationships with foreign elites, 
relations with those states suffered. Also, Constantine and his advisors could not create 
coherent foreign policies toward them. 
In order to prove the impact that personal diplomacy had over diplomatic 
exchanges and foreign policy formation during the empire’s final years, three distinct 
cases will be examined. The first, analyzing Constantine’s relations with the Ottoman 
Turks, represents the failure of Byzantine personal diplomacy, and its effect upon the 
creation of foreign policy. Since the emperor and his court could not establish a close, 
beneficial relationship with any Turkish elites within Constantinople, they could not 
improve relations between the two groups. In addition, Byzantine foreign policy toward 
the Ottomans was haphazardly organized and contradicted itself on several occasions. 
The second case represents the success of Constantine’s personal diplomatic approach, 
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examining his relations with the Papacy. Since the imperial administration was intimately 
familiar with several influential members of the Western Church, especially the papal 
legate sent to supervise the Union of the Churches in Constantinople, the Byzantines 
retained a direct link to the pope. The emperor also heeded the legate’s expertise and 
implemented certain aspects of church union in order to gain needed military support for 
the empire’s defense. The third case, Byzantine relations with the Venetians, also shows 
the efficacy of personal diplomacy. However, Constantine was only partially successful 
in this regard. While he was able to mobilize the considerable Venetian population of 
Constantinople to his cause with the support of their baille, he was unable to secure the 
Venetian Senate’s aid until it was too late for Constantinople. Through each of these 






On the Sources 
 
 
 In order to clearly understand Emperor Constantine XI Palaiologos’ diplomatic 
actions and foreign policies toward the Ottomans, the Papacy, and the Venetians, the 
major sources of this period must be examined. Each of these works also falls into one of 
two categories. Some sources, such as George Sphrantzes, Makarios Melissenos-
Melissourgos, Doukas, Nicolò Barbaro, and Leonard of Chios, detail the events 
surrounding the final destruction of the Byzantine Empire, telling the tale from the Greek 
or Western Christian viewpoint. The final siege and fall of Constantinople to the 
Ottomans in May 1453 occupies a central place in each of these narratives. Other sources, 
such as Kritovoulos and Tursun Beg, view the end of Byzantium through their discussion 
of Ottoman ascendancy. While both of their commentaries discuss Sultan Mehmed II’s 
conquest of the Byzantine capital, this event opens their narratives, which focus upon the 
Ottoman Empire’s expansion and consolidation under his rule. These sources are useful 
to understand Constantine’s diplomatic and foreign policy actions for different reasons. 
However, each possesses limitations that must be examined. 
 The most informative source on Constantine XI’s diplomatic activities is the 
Chronicon Minus of George Sphrantzes, the emperor’s chief ambassador and close 
friend. Sphrantzes spent a considerable amount of time with Constantine, both during his 
tenure in the Morea and as emperor. As a result, Sphrantzes was privy to nearly all of his 
attempts to deter the Ottoman threat to Byzantium, which he details in his chronicle. In 
addition, Sphrantzes carefully describes each of his missions while acting as Constantine 
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XI’s ambassador to other states. This is particularly valuable to a study of Byzantine 
foreign policy in the fifteenth century because his chronicle provides an eyewitness 
account of why certain actions succeeded and others failed during the emperor’s quest to 
save Constantinople. He also includes his personal beliefs and opinions on Byzantine 
foreign relations, and as a member of the imperial court, describes the opinions of the 
emperor’s other advisors. Since George Sphrantzes was present in Constantinople in the 
months prior to, as well as during, the city’s siege by the Turks, his account of 
Constantine XI’s actions in this period is also invaluable to a study of Byzantine foreign 
relations, especially toward the Ottoman Empire.  
However, there are some problems with George Sphrantzes’ Chronicon Minus. 
Sphrantzes often feuded with Constantine’s other ministers as a member of his court, and 
these conflicts show throughout his writings. For example, he portrays Lucas Notaras, 
another respected and experienced advisor, in a negative way. He discredits his policies 
throughout the chronicle, and depicts him as selfish and apathetic toward the condition of 
the empire. This is in direct contrast to other sources, such as Doukas, which portray 
Notaras in more positive ways. Sphrantzes also shows a mistrust of Italians, especially 
the Venetians, in the Chronicon Minus. As a result, he barely mentions the emperor’s 
considerable efforts to convince them to stay in the city during the Ottoman siege, or their 
role during the final assault. Despite these problems, George Sphrantzes’ work is the 
most informative source on Byzantine diplomatic activities and foreign policy during the 
reign of Constantine XI. 
 Another source useful for understanding foreign policy creation during the last 
years of the Byzantine Empire is that of the “Pseudo-Sphrantzes,” Makarios Melissenos-
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Melissourgos. This work, which focuses primarily around the events immediately 
surrounding the siege of Constantinople, was initially attributed to Sphrantzes. However, 
scholars later discovered that this work was created by Melissenos, the metropolitan of 
Monemvasia around the time of the Battle of Lepanto in 1571. There are some obvious 
problems in using this source, since it details events occurring more than a century prior 
to its creation. While much of this account is pure fabrication, coming directly from the 
bishop’s imagination, Marios Philippides has explained that certain sections of this work 
are credible. In specific sections of his siege account, Melissenos draws upon information 
from both George Sphrantzes’ Chronicon Minus and Leonard of Chios’ letter to Pope 
Nicholas V when writing his narrative.
52
 As a result, scholars are able to use Melissenos 
as a source if the information used is also reproduced in either Sphrantzes’ or Leonard’s 
work.
53
 Therefore, this chronicle of the siege is useful as a point of comparison to these 
other two sources, as it helps to confirm the accuracy of their translations from Greek and 
Latin into English. Despite its shortcomings, Makarios Melissenos-Melissourgos’s 
account is helpful for understanding Byzantine diplomacy and foreign policy and 
confirming the accuracy of other sources. 
 Doukas’ history is another useful work for this period of Byzantine history. A 
resident of Lesbos, Doukas served the Genoese Gattilusio family as an ambassador to the 
Ottomans in the 1450s, and remained in the vicinity of Constantinople throughout the 
city’s siege. As a result, he had access to firsthand accounts of the events leading to and 
surrounding Constantinople’s fall. He collected testimony from monks and elites 
captured during the siege, as well as from Turkish soldiers who stormed the city. In 
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addition, his work for the Gattilusio family on Lesbos gave him access to further 
information that he used to write his history.
54
 Therefore, Doukas’ work provides a well-
rounded, comprehensive perspective of the final years of Byzantium, synthesizing 
information from Greek, Latin, and Turkish sources. Unlike Sphrantzes’ chronicle that 
focuses primarily upon his own travels without providing a general perspective, Doukas’ 
history gives a clear overview of the events leading to the fall of Constantinople.  
However, there are some problems with his work. Doukas is also vehemently 
anti-Ottoman in his writings and uses every opportunity to vilify the Turks. His hatred 
forces scholars to carefully consider the historian’s portrayal of the Ottomans’ actions to 
ensure that he does not misrepresent any Ottoman interactions with the Greeks. Doukas’ 
accuracy on many of these interactions is confirmed by other contemporary authors, but 
his anti-Ottoman stance still merits caution when using his work. In addition, while 
Doukas was in the vicinity of Constantinople during the siege, he did not witness it 
firsthand, nor was he in the imperial capital at any time during Constantine XI’s reign. As 
a result, his sections regarding the final Byzantine emperor must be compared to the other 
firsthand accounts, such as those of Sphrantzes, Nicolò Barbaro, or Leonard of Chios. 
Nonetheless, Doukas remains a generally reliable source on the final decades of 
Byzantium. 
The siege diary of Nicolò Barbaro, a Venetian surgeon and resident of 
Constantinople, provides an excellent account of Venetian activities both prior to and 
during the city’s siege in 1453. Barbaro’s daily account provides a clear chronology of 
Byzantine actions shortly before and during the Ottoman siege, focusing mainly upon the 
Venetians in the capital, and Emperor Constantine’s relations with them. Barbaro was 
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present at several meetings held between the imperial administration and the Venetians, 
and describes their proceedings in his diary. While the diary is an excellent source for 
Venetian interactions with the emperor and for Venice’s efforts during the siege, 
Barbaro’s account also poses a major problem.  
Nicolò Barbaro, a patriotic Venetian, holds considerable contempt for many 
Greeks (aside from the emperor) and the Genoese participating in Constantinople’s 
defense. He constantly downplays the efforts of the Greek soldiers and noblemen during 
the siege. For example, he chastises the Byzantines for often abandoning their posts in the 
city during the crisis.
55
 However, Barbaro fails to recognize that these soldiers left their 
positions to search for food in order to feed their starving families, since most of the 
Venetians in Constantinople left their families in Italy. Therefore, his lack of perspective 
leads to a strong anti-Greek sentiment within his diary. Barbaro also shows a typical 
Venetian hostility toward the Genoese, Venice’s Italian rivals. He also minimizes the 
Genoese involvement in Constantinople’s defense, and blames them for the city’s 
eventual fall. Even with these limitations, Nicolò Barbaro provides the most 
comprehensive account of Venetian interactions with the Byzantines in the 1450s, 
especially with Emperor Constantine XI. 
Leonard of Chios, bishop of Mytilene who accompanied Cardinal Isidore to 
Constantinople and assisted with the supervision of church union, presents another major 
source of this period. Present during the siege and capture of Constantinople, Leonard’s 
account is written in a letter to Pope Nicholas V, informing him of the city’s fall. This 
source is most valuable for its information regarding Constantine’s actions while 
implementing union in the capital. Since Leonard was a close associate of Isidore, acting 
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as his aide during the mission to Byzantium, his letter also shows the cardinal’s advice to 
the emperor concerning his application of that union. The emperor’s selective 
implementation of union irritates Leonard, and this shows throughout his letter. He also 
generally disdains the Constantinopolitan citizenry for their opposition to the Roman 
church, as well as the Venetians in the city because of his Genoese heritage. Therefore, 
his characterizations of these people must be considered carefully and examined through 
this bias. However, his account is generally confirmed by other sources and is crucial to 
understanding the Byzantine implementation of church union during the empire’s final 
years. 
While each of the previous sources details Byzantium’s fall from the Christian 
perspective, two major accounts view it from the Turkish one. Kritovoulos, governor of 
Imbros while the island was under Ottoman occupation in the 1450s and 1460s, describes 
the events leading to the fall of Constantinople from the viewpoint of Sultan Mehmed II. 
Kritovoulos’ work begins with the ascendancy of Mehmed in 1451, providing a detailed 
summary of the sultan’s relationship with Constantine XI, as well as the effect that the 
Byzantine emperor’s efforts had upon Ottoman policy. His chronicle is also important 
because it provides a counterbalance to the strongly anti-Ottoman histories written by 
Greek authors, such as Doukas. Kritovoulos’ position also gave him access to 
information regarding Turkish actions prior to the siege of Constantinople. For example, 
he provides considerable details of Mehmed II’s fortress along the Bosphorus, Rumeli 
Hisar, and the emperor’s attempts to dissuade the sultan from constructing it. While 
useful for this information, Kritovoulos wrote his work in order to gain the direct favor of 
Mehmed II in Constantinople, as he wanted the sultan to provide him with a pension once 
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he was removed from his governorship. Therefore, the Ottomans are not portrayed 
negatively, and the Greeks’ efforts to save Constantinople from them are marginalized. In 
addition, since Kritovoulos was not present at the Ottoman court before the siege, his 
account relies upon information gathered approximately a decade after the events he 
describes. However, Kritovoulos’ chronicle provides important information regarding the 
Ottoman perspective of Byzantine diplomatic overtures, as well as Turkish preparations 
for the assault upon Constantinople. 
The history of Tursun Beg, a member of Sultan Mehmed II’s court, also details 
the end of Byzantium from the Ottoman perspective. His proximity to the sultan provides 
information regarding Mehmed’s relationship with his advisors, particularly his Grand 
Vizier Candarli Halil Pasha, whom the Byzantines tried to court. Tursun Beg’s account, 
like that of Kritovoulos, also explains the effects that Constantine XI’s diplomatic actions 
and foreign policy had upon the Ottoman Empire before Constantinople’s fall. However, 
his explanation is brief. Tursun Beg instead focuses the majority of his work upon 
Mehmed’s consolidation of power following the capture of Constantinople. Despite his 
brevity, Tursun Beg’s history of Mehmed II’s reign adds to the understanding of 
Byzantine diplomacy and foreign policy under Emperor Constantine XI. 
While other accounts also show Constantine XI’s and his court’s reliance upon 
personal diplomacy to achieve their objectives, these seven sources constitute the main 
body of information regarding the Byzantine Empire of the fifteenth century. Each 
provides a unique insight into the events of the period, possessing different strengths and 
telling integral parts of the story. Even so, these sources must be used carefully. Each 
work possesses limitations and biases that influence the information that they purport to 
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present. These issues were dutifully considered before the works were used in this study. 







Constantine and the Ottomans 
 
 
 Constantine XI Palaiologos’ diplomatic actions and foreign policy toward the 
Ottoman Empire did not succeed because he and his administration did not have access to 
the expertise of Turkish elites. As a result, Constantine continued the policies of the 
previous Byzantine emperor, his brother John VIII, bracing the city for an Ottoman 
assault. In addition, the emperor alternated between confronting and supplicating the 
Turks, which eventually led to disaster. Constantine and his councilors attempted to court 
the widow of Sultan Murad II and the Ottoman Grand Vizier Candarli Halil Pasha to their 
cause, but did not succeed. Instead, Murad’s widow remained apathetic toward the 
Greeks and Halil Pasha assisted Sultan Mehmed II’s siege and assault upon 
Constantinople in the spring of 1453. When Constantine did not gain access to the 
Ottoman court through these elites, he relied upon his advisors for advice on a proper 
course of action toward the Turks. However, the emperor’s advisors heavily relied upon 
foreign expertise. Since they did not have access to the Ottoman court, their cohesiveness 
disintegrated and they presented differing ideas of how to end the Ottoman threat to the 
imperial capital. Constantine XI vacillated between his advisors’ opinions, alternately 
using strategies of aggression and supplication in order to dissuade a general assault upon 
Constantinople. These policies were unsuccessful. Without the presence of pro-Greek 
Ottoman political elites in the Byzantine capital, the emperor and his advisors could not 
formulate a coherent and effective policy toward the Ottoman Empire. 
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Constantine’s actions were motivated by his court’s inability to provide him with 
decisive advice for countering the Ottoman threat. By the mid-fifteenth century, the 
imperial court degenerated into an arena for personal vendettas and rivalries between 
Byzantine notables. While the Byzantine court was always a bastion of intrigue and 
revolution, from the days of Basil I to John V, the empire’s last decade saw these rivalries 
increase dramatically. The drastic decrease in imperial territorial possessions led to a 
corresponding decrease in the size of the imperial administration. As a result, the 
shortage of qualified, capable individuals for imperial positions led emperors, beginning 
in the fourteenth century, to increasingly entrust sensitive positions and political activities 
to their own men of confidence.
56
 When each new emperor promoted his own followers 
into important positions, they collided with the associates of the previous emperor, who 
were eager to retain their positions of influence within the imperial administration. The 
administration that Constantine XI inherited upon his accession to the Byzantine throne 
suffered from these same problems.
57
 Even though the emperor reviewed each situation 
carefully, he relied upon his own expertise in military affairs, and relied upon his court’s 
greater expertise in matters of diplomacy and foreign policy. The emperor often 
complained that his ministers were too busy feuding among themselves in order to secure 
their offices, that they did not concern themselves with the well being of the empire.
58
 In 
addition, when they did offer advice to the emperor, the other ministers would constantly 
undermine their suggestions in an attempt to discredit that counselor in his eyes.
59
 Such 
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conditions plagued Emperor Constantine’s administration and severely hindered his 
ability to reach decisions regarding a policy toward the Ottoman Empire. 
 Each of Constantine XI’s advisors held a different position regarding relations 
with the Ottoman Turks. One of the emperor’s most prominent advisors was Lucas 
Notaras, the megadux, or grand admiral of the Byzantine navy. While Byzantium no 
longer possessed any significant naval forces, this position was expanded into that of an 
informal prime minister. Notaras gained his position of megadux from Emperor John 
VIII, who considered Notaras a close friend.
60
 However, he did not gain his position 
solely based upon imperial patronage. Lucas Notaras accompanied John VIII on several 
diplomatic missions before his promotion and was widely considered throughout the 
Christian world as a man of great experience.
61
 The megadux Notaras not only gained the 
trust of John VIII, but also became close friends with his brother Constantine. Notaras 
also traveled with Constantine during his campaigns against the Franks as despot of the 
Morea. In fact, the two became so close that Notaras attended Constantine’s first wedding 
on the island of Lesbos.
62
 Therefore, his views carried a high degree of influence with the 
emperor during his deliberations over a proper course of action toward the Ottoman 
Empire. 
 Notaras believed that any relationship with the Turks had to focus upon 
dissuading them from attacking the imperial capital. The megadux believed that the 
defense of Constantinople should be the emperor’s first priority, and any action that could 
potentially relieve the Turkish threat to the city should be exploited. However, he 
believed that the best course of action toward the Ottomans was to stall for time while 
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Byzantium asked the western Christians for aid. If Constantinople’s fortifications could 
hold out against Ottoman advances for enough time, Notaras believed that the Western 
Christian powers would eventually come to Byzantium’s aid.
63
 In order to achieve this, 
the Byzantines needed to exploit instabilities within the Ottoman court, stirring up 
pretenders to the throne and rival Turkish emirates to distract the sultan from the 
conquest of Constantinople. In addition, Lucas Notaras believed that any action taken by 
the Turks against the city would require so much time because of the city’s fortifications, 
that the Latin Christians could intervene on behalf of Byzantium.
64
 Throughout 
Constantine’s reign, the megadux stubbornly and vocally maintained this position, often 
antagonizing the emperor’s other close associates, such as George Sphrantzes.
65
 Lucas 
Notaras’ notable reputation amongst Byzantine citizens gained him many allies among 
the lesser nobles and Greek merchants within Constantinople, further enhancing the 
power of his ideas. The emperor’s close relationship with the megadux caused him to 
seriously consider Notaras’ proposals. 
 Another important advisor of Constantine XI was George Sphrantzes, the 
emperor’s closest friend and associate since his reign as despot, who provided a 
counterweight to the views of Lucas Notaras. Sphrantzes grew up in the imperial court of 
Manuel II, eventually entering the service of John VIII upon his accession to the 
Byzantine throne. Constantine, realizing Sphrantzes’ talents, requested and received his 
services from John VIII.
66
 Until Constantine became emperor in 1448, George 
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Sphrantzes was his personal assistant in the Morea, serving the despot during his 
numerous military campaigns against the Frankish lords.
67
 During this time, Sphrantzes’ 
relationship to Constantine grew from a professional to a personal one. In fact, the two 
became so close of friends that Constantine was both best man at his wedding and 
godfather to both of his children.
68
 As a result, when he became emperor, Constantine 
brought Sphrantzes to the imperial capital, promoting him to the office of First Lord of 
the Imperial Wardrobe. In this position, George Sphrantzes possessed more access than 
any other imperial official to the imperial residence, giving him the ability to greatly 
influence the emperor’s opinion. 
 George Sphrantzes held a very cautious position toward the Ottoman Turks, 
especially upon the accession of Mehmed II. Sphrantzes advocated an even more careful 
position than Lucas Notaras, whom he believed unnecessarily risked antagonizing the 
new sultan. In addition, Sphrantzes opposed Notaras because he and the megadux rarely 
cooperated with each other.
69
 He believed that Murad II, Mehmed’s father, was a threat 
to Byzantium’s survival while he was a young man, but posed little threat to the empire 
during his later years. Sphrantzes knew that he merely wished to live the remainder of his 
life in peace.
70
 However, the young Mehmed, only nineteen years old at his father’s death 
in 1449, was entirely different. George Sphrantzes believed that directly antagonizing the 
new sultan would give him the pretext necessary to begin a war with the Greeks, 
eventually leading to the fall of Constantinople. During a conversation with the King of 
Trebizond, Sphrantzes reveals this opinion:  
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This man, who just became sultan, is young and an enemy of the Christians since 
childhood; he threatens with proud spirit that he will put in operation certain plans 
against the Christians… If God should grant that the young sultan be overcome by 
his youth and evil nature and march against our City, I know not what will 
happen. Indeed God would have granted a joyous occasion if this man, Murad’s 




Therefore, George Sphrantzes clearly opposed any hostile policies toward the Ottoman 
Empire. He did agree with the megadux that the Byzantines should seek aid from the 
west, but wanted to do so in a discrete manner to avoid Ottoman attention. Like Lucas 
Notaras, the First Lord of the Imperial Wardrobe commanded a vast amount of respect 
both from the Greek nobility and the Constantinopolitan citizenry. Emperor Constantine 
XI also seriously considered following Sphrantzes’ proposed course of action. 
 In addition to these two major forces, Constantine entertained the opinions of 
many other lesser counselors. Andronikos Kantakouzenos, the Grand Domestic, was 
another of Constantine’s ministers advocating aggressive actions toward the Ottomans. 
As commander-in-chief of the Byzantine army, Kantakouzenos wished to use the military 
to exploit weaknesses in the Ottoman Empire. Much like the megadux, the Grand 
Domestic wanted to take advantage of the constant rebellions and uprisings they faced in 
Anatolia from other Turkish groups under Ottoman suzerainty. A zealous Unionist, 
Kantakouzenos believed that if Western aid promised by the Council of Florence arrived, 
the combined Christian forces would re-conquer the European and Asiatic provinces for 
Christianity.
72
 Constantine and the Grand Domestic often quarreled over the imperial 
positions toward other states, especially Serbia. While Constantine was proud of his 
mother’s Serbian heritage and favored the idea of improving relations between 
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Byzantium and Serbia, Kantakouzenos fundamentally mistrusted the Serbian state, 
opposing any sort of rapprochement between the two states.
73
 As a result, the emperor did 
not fully trust the Grand Domestic’s foreign policy advice. The Byzantine army’s 
extreme decline in the fifteenth century also marginalized Andronikos Kantakouzenos in 
the imperial court, since the small size of the regular forces limited his influence. 
Therefore, his foreign policy suggestions were less influential than those of Lucas 
Notaras or George Sphrantzes. 
 Demetrios Palaiologos Kantakouzenos, a cousin of Emperor Constantine XI, also 
held a lesser position in the imperial administration as one of the emperor’s minor 
advisors. Demetrios Kantakouzenos served both in the Constantinopolitan administration 
of John VIII and in the Morea under Despot Constantine.
74
 He was instrumental in 
convincing John VIII that releasing the Ottoman pretender Mustafa, a political prisoner 
held hostage in Constantinople in 1422, would greatly benefit the empire.
75
 While this 
plan ultimately failed, and proved to be a complete disaster for Byzantium, Demetrios did 
not lose all of his influence in the imperial court. During Constantine’s reign, he also 
advocated similarly aggressive actions against the Ottoman Turks, most notably through 
the release and exploitation of pretenders to the Ottoman throne, such as Prince Orhan. 
As a result, Demetrios Palaiologos Kantakouzenos became a lesser ally of Lucas Notaras, 
although his previous debacle somewhat crippled his prestige amongst the 
Constantinopolitan elites. 
 Several other lesser Greek notables vacillated over Emperor Constantine’s 
Ottoman policy during his reign. Another member of the Kantakouzenos family, John, 
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served as governor of Patras and Corinth in the Morea under Constantine until joining the 
emperor in Constantinople in 1449. He also believed that aggressive action was necessary 
for Byzantium’s survival, but agreed to abide by whatever course of action the emperor 
chose to follow.
76
 Other Byzantine advisors, such as Theophilos Palaiologos, carried 
similar views. Instead of creating innovative ways of countering the Ottoman threat, they 
merely wished to ingratiate themselves with the new emperor. As a result, these advisors 
were useless to Constantine during his decision making processes. 
While these ministers provided Emperor Constantine with varying degrees of 
advice on the Ottoman problem, several of his trusted advisors were unable to provide 
suggested actions because of their deaths prior to his reign. Another Greek notable, the 
protostrator Manuel Kantakouzenos, provided the emperor with sound advice throughout 
his tenure in the Morea regarding the Franks. Constantine fully trusted his views.
77
 
However, Manuel died sometime before 1451, and Constantine could not turn to him for 
advice on his Ottoman policy during his reign as emperor.
78
 Yet another Greek that 
influenced Constantine XI, although in an informal way, was his mother Helena. The 
empress always favored Constantine among her children, even securing the throne for 
him upon John VIII’s death in 1448, amidst claims by one of her other sons, Demetrios. 
As emperor, Constantine heavily relied upon his mother’s advice until her death on 
March 23, 1450, shortly after his accession. Once she died, the emperor did not know 
whom to fully rely upon for advice.
79
 As a result of the varying positions regarding the 
Ottoman Turks among Constantine’s closest associates, the indecision of significant 
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segments of the Byzantine lesser nobility, and the loss of crucial people in his life, the 
emperor continued to use stalling tactics against the Ottoman Empire rather than adopt a 
new strategy. 
The Byzantine court’s reliance upon personal diplomacy during Constantine XI’s 
reign shows through George Sphrantzes’ proposed marriage alliance with Mara 
Brankovi  of Serbia in 1451. Mara had been the wife of Sultan Murad II, and a highly 
regarded presence in the Ottoman court, especially by her stepson, Mehmed II. In fact, 
Mehmed respected the Sultana Mara so much that upon his father’s death, the new sultan 
allowed her to return to her father’s house in Serbia.
80
 While the sultana was nearing 
middle age, calling her ability to produce an heir into question, George Sphrantzes 
believed that a marriage between Mehmed’s stepmother and Constantine would greatly 
benefit Byzantium and forestall any future Turkish assault upon Constantinople.
81
 Mara’s 
respect and reputation among the Ottoman court could also potentially guarantee several 
concessions by the Turks, helping to revitalize the Byzantine state. 
Constantine XI wholeheartedly supported George Sphrantzes’ proposition upon 
hearing of it. However, rivalries within the Byzantine court led several ministers to 
oppose the marriage, casting doubts in the emperor’s mind concerning its viability. While 
Sphrantzes believed in the merits of this marriage alliance, Grand Domestic Andronikos 
Kantakouzenos and Governor John Kantakouzenos disputed its usefulness because of 
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their extreme mistrust of the Serbian state.
82
 As a result, Constantine was paralyzed by 
the contradictory recommendations of his associates. Sphrantzes details the emperor’s 
frustration with the discord within his court: “On whom could I have relied? On the 
monks? They are far impractical in such matters. On the nobles? Whom could I have 
found so impartial to keep it to himself?”
83
 Constantine’s subsequent hesitation in making 
a decision regarding the marriage alliance without strong support in his court became 
inconsequential soon after the proposal had circulated among the elites in Constantinople, 
as Mara had no desire to remarry.
84
 
Mara’s refusal to remarry signaled the death knell of George Sphrantzes’ proposal 
and also showed the failure of the Byzantines’ strategy of personal diplomacy toward the 
Ottoman Turks. Since the reign of Manuel II, Byzantine emperors attempted to 
strengthen the bonds between Byzantine and Ottoman elites and rulers. Manuel carefully 
cultivated a relationship with Sultan Mehmed I, eventually establishing a peaceful 
exchange between the two states.
85
 George Sphrantzes tried to accomplish this for 
Constantine and Mehmed II as well. By associating Mehmed’s beloved stepmother with 
the Byzantine emperor, Sphrantzes hoped to create a parental relationship between them. 
While Mara’s refusal to marry ended this particular endeavor, Sphrantzes was 
discouraged from trying similar tactics again because of the discord and problems this 
event caused among the imperial court and the emperor himself. 
Since the proactive elements of Constantine’s court were discouraged from 
establishing new personal relationships with elites within the Ottoman Empire, the 
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Byzantines tried to use existing relationships that were cultivated during the reigns of 
Manuel II and John VIII. The most important relationship for Byzantium was with 
Candarli Halil Pasha, Grand Vizier to both Murad II and Mehmed II. For decades, Greek 
nobles sent bribes to the vizier in Adrianople in order to gain his trust and favor.
86
 Such 
actions were successful, and Halil Pasha became well known for his friendly disposition 
toward the Byzantine Empire. In fact, even Italians knew of Halil’s relationship with the 
Greeks. The Florentine Tetaldi, who defended Constantinople in 1453, describes Candarli 
Halil as “the Christians’ friend.”
87
 The vizier’s conciliatory nature was also known 
among the Turks, who called him gavur ortagi.
88
 The Greeks’ bribery did succeed to a 
degree, as Halil Pasha occasionally spoke in favor of Byzantium. For example, Halil was 
one of the most outspoken opponents of an assault upon Constantinople, since he 
believed it would unnecessarily antagonize the Italian merchant states and because the 
city’s fortifications were too strong to overcome.
89
 
However, the Greeks overestimated their influence over the Ottoman Grand 
Vizier. While Halil Pasha did speak in favor of Byzantium, he did so because it was in 
the Ottomans’ best interest. While Greek bribes encouraged him to loudly voice his 
opinions that coincided with Byzantine interests, he was still fundamentally loyal to the 
Ottoman state. In addition, once Mehmed II rose to the throne in 1451, Halil Pasha lost a 
considerable amount of influence over the sultan. While Murad II had often looked to 
him for advice and viewed him as a close friend, Mehmed resented the control that Halil 
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held over him. In 1444, Murad II attempted to retire to a private life of contemplation, 
leaving the Ottoman government in the hands of Mehmed. However, the Crusade of 
Varna crossed into Turkish territory shortly thereafter, and the young sultan did not 
possess the knowledge necessary to defeat them. As a result, Halil Pasha led a group of 
advisors and army commanders that forced the young sultan to recall his father Murad to 
the throne.
90
 Mehmed, after being sequestered at Manisa, never forgave Halil for his 
transgression. Instead, he turned to Halil’s archenemy, Zaganos Pasha, for advice. 
Zaganos had served as Mehmed’s tutor during his exile at Manisa, and followed the 
sultan to Adrianople upon his succession in 1451. Zaganos took advantage of every 
opportunity to berate and undermine Halil Pasha while at the Ottoman court, and slowly 
usurped the latter’s influence and responsibilities in Mehmed’s government.
91
 As a result, 
Candarli Halil Pasha no longer held a significant amount of influence over the sultan’s 
actions, as he had during the reign of Murad II. In fact, he was later executed by the 




This misguided reliance upon Halil Pasha led the Byzantine Empire to disaster. 
Constantine’s aggressively anti-Turkish advisors, led by Andronikos and Demetrios 
Palaiologos Kantakouzenos, convinced the emperor to blatantly provoke the Ottomans 
because they believed Byzantium had the vizier’s unconditional support. They thought 
that even if their provocation was unsuccessful, Halil Pasha would intervene on the 
Greeks behalf to prevent disaster. As a result, Constantine sent a mission to Mehmed 
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explaining that unless Prince Orhan’s annuity was doubled, the Byzantines would release 
him as a rival claimant to the Ottoman throne.
93
 Halil Pasha, instead of supporting the 
emperor’s demands, railed against them. He scolded the Byzantine ambassadors, saying: 
O stupid and foolish Romans, I know your cunning ways from long ago. Leave 
well enough alone! The deceased ruler was gentle and to all he was a sincere 
friend and a man of upright conscience. Our present ruler Mehmed, however, is 
not of the same disposition as you seem to imagine. If Constantinople succeeds in 
escaping from his hands – I speak of his insolence, savagery, and violence – then 
I will know that God still ignores your machinations and perversions… We are 
not children without sense or strength. If there is something you can do, do it… 
Be certain, however, that you will not succeed in any of these projects. Instead, 
that which you think is yours will be taken from you. Nonetheless, I will make 




Halil agreed to present the Byzantines’ demands to the sultan, but refused to support 
them. The result was disastrous. Mehmed continued his preparations to take the city. 
 In addition, when the sultan finally decided to undertake the siege and assault of 
Constantinople, Halil Pasha provided him with his assistance. When summoned to the 
sultan’s bedchamber and ordered to help plan the conquest of Constantinople, Halil did 
not attempt to dissuade Mehmed from the endeavor.
95
 On the contrary, the vizier offered 
his expertise to take the city. Doukas characterizes Halil through his speech to the sultan: 
“Lord, God who has given you the greater portion of the land of the Romans, will also 
grant you the City [Constantinople]. I am convinced that she will not slip through your 
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hands. Together with God and your might, I and all your servants will fight as one, not 
only with our wealth but also with our flesh and blood. You may be certain of that.”
96
 
While Halil answered in this way out of fear for his life, this incident shows that the 
grand vizier’s ultimate loyalties were not to the Greeks, but to the sultan who held Halil’s 
very life within his hands. The Byzantines efforts of personal diplomacy had failed. 
 The Greeks also overestimated the value of their bribery to the Ottoman grand 
vizier. While Byzantine nobles provided Halil with considerable gifts in the form of art 
and gold, they could not compete with the gifts and salary provided by the Ottoman 
sultan himself. Mehmed II, like most Ottomans, knew that the grand vizier accepted 
bribes in order to voice certain opinions that were favorable to Byzantium. While he 
could have merely sacked the vizier, the sultan instead used the Greeks’ own tactics 
against them. The sultan provided all of his advisors with lavish gifts that were far larger 
than anything Byzantium could afford.
97
 As a result, Mehmed secured Halil’s loyalty, as 
well as the loyalty of all his close advisors, by preempting any foreign attempts to bribe 
them. 
 The Byzantines were also forced to rely upon their relationship with Candarli 
Halil Pasha because they did not have access to any of Mehmed’s tutors or advisors 
before he became sultan. The Greeks’ weak relationship with Halil Pasha required years 
of effort to build, spanning much of Sultan Murad II’s reign. This process was expedited 
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because of Halil’s location in Adrianople, Murad’s capital.
98
 Byzantine and Ottoman 
merchants participated in a very brisk and profitable trade between Adrianople and 
Constantinople, and it was therefore possible to reach the Ottoman vizier with messages 
and gifts.
99
 However, Mehmed and his advisors resided in Manisa, which was less easily 
accessible to Byzantine travelers. As a result, the imperial administration knew very little 
about the nature of Mehmed’s court and had no opportunities to develop relations with 
any of its members through bribery or other means. 
Since the Byzantines’ efforts of personal diplomacy were unsuccessful, the 
imperial administration resorted to disjointed actions toward the Ottoman Empire. When 
the gamble over Prince Orhan failed, Constantine XI chose to follow his predecessors’ 
policies of superficial appeasement and supplication of the sultan. The emperor hoped to 
use this deference to gain time to develop a cohesive plan of action concerning the 
Ottomans. This was shown during Constantine’s confirmation as Emperor of the 
Romans. Since Byzantium was essentially a vassal state of the Ottoman Empire, the 
sultan often oversaw changes in leadership. When John VIII died on October 31, 1448 
without an heir, his two brothers Constantine and Demetrios contested the Byzantine 
throne. While Demetrios, a fervent opponent of the west, had the support of the anti-
Unionist faction in Constantinople, Constantine was significantly more popular both in 
the Morea and in Constantinople. In addition, he possessed the support of his mother, 
Empress Helena, which added overwhelming credibility to Constantine’s claim to the 
empire. However, since the Byzantines were technically vassals of the Ottoman sultan, 
Constantine agreed to submit the Byzantine succession to Murad II for arbitration. Such 
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an act of deference was extremely uncharacteristic of Constantine, especially because of 
his previous actions toward the Ottomans. On December 6, 1448, George Sphrantzes led 
an embassy to Murad’s court, and Constantine was chosen as the Byzantine emperor.
100
 
The new emperor hoped that his deference to Ottoman authority would help pacify the 
sultan while he deliberated on ways to combat the Turks. Once Sphrantzes returned from 
his embassy, the emperor sent Murad lavish gifts to commemorate a new period of peace 
between them.
101
 Through this episode, Constantine showed false obsequiousness toward 
Murad II in order to mask his true anti-Turkish sentiments. This was shown through his 
attacks in Greece during and after the Crusade of Varna. 
Constantine also used acts of deference toward Murad’s son Mehmed in an 
attempt to stall for more time to create an effective Turkish policy. The historian Doukas 
intimates that the Greeks were among the first to greet and congratulate the new sultan 
upon Murad’s death.
102
 Constantine clearly wanted to placate young Mehmed for the 
immediate future, while Byzantium committed to a strategy that would undermine 
Ottoman power around the Aegean. The emperor’s embassy succeeded in creating a truce 
with the sultan, creating another temporary respite from Ottoman hostility. However, 
such a truce was just as beneficial to Mehmed as it was to Constantine, as the sultan 
needed time to secure his rule over his empire. Mehmed extended several concessions to 
the emperor, offering a perpetual peace with Byzantium as well as an annual stipend for 
the maintenance of Prince Orhan, a rival claimant to the Ottoman throne held as a 
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political prisoner in Constantinople.
103
 Through this superficial act, Constantine received 
a peace allowing the Byzantines more time to formulate a cohesive and effective 
Ottoman policy. In addition, this embassy served as a fact-finding mission for the 
Byzantines, who knew very little about the young new sultan. 
Constantine XI based his acts of supplication and deference upon those of his 
father. Emperor Manuel II often used acts in order to stall Ottoman aggression against the 
shrinking empire. For example, when Sultan Murad I sought to absorb Constantinople 
into his realm amidst Byzantine civil strife in 1379, Manuel encouraged his father, John 
V, to offer himself to the Ottoman ruler as a vassal.
104
 This supplication worked, and the 
Ottomans shifted their attention to more pressing concerns on their borders. Manuel also 
used this policy of appeasement to his advantage in 1387, after attempting several 
aggressive actions while despot of Thessalonika. Once his offensives were halted and the 
Ottomans laid siege to Thessalonika, Manuel turned once again to supplication. He 
arranged a meeting with Murad I in the Ottoman capital of Brusa, where he 
acknowledged the sultan’s suzerainty over him.
105
 As a result, the despot was allowed to 
continue to rule in Thessalonika. Such actions also allowed the young Manuel time to 
develop new strategies to combat the Ottomans and save his empire. Emperor 
Constantine XI used these actions as templates for his own policy toward the Ottoman 
Empire, since his advisors and counselors could not present him with a decisive strategy. 
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Even after Mehmed’s intentions of military action against Constantine became 
clear, the emperor tried to stall the sultan with diplomatic overtures, trying in vain to 
stave off the Ottomans until the Byzantines could develop a counter to the siege of 
Constantinople. When Mehmed began building the fortress of Rumeli Hisar, Constantine 
realized that his city was in danger of being starved of supplies. Therefore, the emperor 
sent numerous embassies to the sultan to try to prevent its creation. Constantine’s 
ambassadors stated that when Sultan Mehmed I wished to build a fortress on the Asian 
side of the Bosphorus, he asked for the permission of Emperor Manuel II “like a son 
importuning his father.”
106
 When Mehmed refused to ask for Constantine’s permission to 
build his fortress, the emperor turned to supplication. He offered to pay the Ottomans a 
large annual indemnity if work on Rumeli Hisar would cease, and sent the Ottoman 
authorities daily gifts to dissuade them from finishing the fortress’ construction.
107
 
However, the Byzantines’ attempts to stall Ottoman efforts against Constantinople were 
unsuccessful. 
Emperor Constantine XI’s actions toward the Turks while despot of the Morea 
(from 1443 to 1448) show that he preferred to take decisive, aggressive action against the 
Ottomans, and that his acts of deference were merely a stalling tactic. The emperor, while 
ruling southern Greece, was clearly anti-Turkish in his views and policies. Constantine’s 
earliest actions against the Ottomans coincided with the Crusade of Varna, launched from 
Hungary in 1444. The Byzantines learned of the crusade in 1443, when John VIII went 
on a hunting expedition with the Italian traveler Cyriacus of Ancona.
108
 The Greeks 
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thought of the crusade in two ways. First, they believed that if the Hungarians could fight 
their way to Constantinople, the city’s immediate encirclement would be relieved. They 
could then concentrate on re-conquering Thrace from the weakened Turks. Second, the 
Greeks of the Morea, Constantine included, counted upon the crusade to provide a 
necessary distraction so that they could reoccupy portions of central Greece.
109
 
The despot used the distraction that the Western crusaders provided to conquer 
several cities and towns from the Turks in Attica and Thessaly. The chronicler Doukas 
explains that Constantine “foresaw the total destruction of the Turks” during his 
campaign throughout late 1444 and 1445.
110
 While the despot made considerable gains 
early in the campaign, once the crusaders were defeated at Varna, the sultan could focus 
his attention upon the Greeks.
111
 Despite overwhelming numbers of Turkish troops, 
Constantine refused to return control of the conquered territories to Sultan Murad II. 
Instead, he prepared for battle at the newly refortified Hexamilion wall across the Isthmus 
of Corinth.
112
 The Byzantines of the Morea also placed more emphasis upon exploiting 
human weaknesses in siege warfare than upon technological advantage, since they did 
not possess the financial resources necessary to outpace the Ottomans in military 
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 Therefore, the isthmian walls were built in a medieval fashion, and did not 
possess any defensive artillery to discourage an Ottoman assault. Constantine misjudged 
the quality of his fortifications, as Murad, using gunpowder artillery, smashed through 
them and routed the defenders.
114
 The Turks took over 60,000 prisoners, and Constantine 
barely escaped with his life.
115
 This episode shows Constantine’s tendency toward rash, 
aggressive actions against the Ottoman Turks even before his accession to the Byzantine 
throne.  
However, the emperor’s actions did have a historical premise. Constantine based 
these tactics on previous actions of Manuel II, during his tenure as despot of 
Thessalonika. Manuel, in defiance of his father John V’s instructions, began military 
operations against the Turks surrounding Thessalonika in the late fourteenth century.
116
 
Manuel attempted to use upheavals within the Ottoman Empire to weaken the Turkish 
position in Macedonia, using these distractions to reoccupy several towns and villages in 
the area around Thessalonika. However, the Ottomans restored order and the sultan easily 
crushed Manuel, as he did to Constantine less than fifty years later. In fact, Manuel’s 
actions directly caused the loss of Thessalonika to the Turks in the first years of the 
fifteenth century. Since Constantine believed that circumstances, not Manuel’s actions, 
caused his plans to fail, the despot believed that the plans would succeed because of the 
massive distraction caused by the Hungarian crusaders. While Constantine’s plan also 
failed, this episode shows his offensive tendencies toward the Ottoman Turks. 
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 The only concrete policy that Emperor Constantine XI insisted upon regarding the 
Ottoman Empire was the refortification of Constantinople. The Byzantine emperor was a 
soldier above all else, and fundamentally believed that diplomacy would eventually give 
way to military action and a siege by the Ottomans.
117
 Shortly after Constantine’s 
accession in 1448, he ordered Constantinopolitan citizens to requisition large amounts of 
grain and other supplies to help the city withstand a siege by the Ottoman Turks.
118
 In 
addition, the emperor began transferring the population of Constantinople’s hinterland 
into the confines of the city. Constantine feared for their safety in the event of war, and 
wanted to forestall any Turkish actions against them.
119
 Emperor Constantine’s belief that 
diplomatic overtures toward the Ottomans would fail led to these safeguards for 
Byzantine citizens. 
This belief is also a cause of Constantine’s monumental efforts to repair 
Constantinople’s triple land walls. Upon his accession to the throne, he immediately 
assigned his kinsman Manuel Palaeologus Iagrus the task of restoring the land walls 
damaged during Murad II’s abortive siege of the city in 1422. Despite the city’s lack of 
financial resources, the work was dutifully completed by the end of 1452.
120
 After their 
restoration, the land walls facing the Lycus Valley were extremely formidable.
121
 The 
inner wall, the largest of the three, was over 25 feet high and over eight feet thick, with 
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the outer wall standing at 15 feet with a thickness of nearly six feet. In addition, the outer 
moat was cleared of debris and refilled, providing the city with even more protection.
122
 
While Iagrus possessed sufficient resources, as well as the city’s skilled masons, to 
restore the walls to a prime medieval condition, he did not have enough money to 
modernize the fortifications to support and defend against gunpowder artillery. In fact, 
most medieval cities did not possess the resources necessary to modernize their defenses, 
since the new building materials of choice, such as granite, were extremely expensive.
123
 
In addition, Ottoman artillery easily demolished large sections of the walls during the 
siege because they retained the medieval style. 
While the emperor was committed to repairing Constantinople’s fortifications 
upon his accession to the Byzantine throne, Sultan Mehmed II’s decision to build a 
fortress on the European side of the Bosphorus, Rumeli Hisar, deepened his commitment 
to the project. In the spring of 1452, Mehmed decided that he needed a way to control the 
shipping traveling through the Bosphorus.
124
 He therefore endeavored to build a modern 
fortress, which he named Rumeli Hisar.
125
 The historian Kritovoulos details Mehmed’s 
preparations, as well as the specifications of the fortress. While the refortification of 
Constantinople took nearly five years because of the city’s financial troubles, Mehmed 
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constructed Rumeli Hisar within six months.
126
 The walls of the fortress, over twenty-five 
feet high and nearly ten feet thick, were reinforced with iron and lead joints and designed 
to withstand attacks by ship-mounted cannon.
127
 In addition, the fortress’ massive towers 
were designed to support huge cannons that were capable of sinking any vessel illegally 
traveling through the Bosphorus.
128
 This modern fortress’ impregnability influenced 
Constantine’s decision to repair Constantinople’s defenses. The emperor ordered that 
cannons be mounted upon the walls in order to emulate Rumeli Hisar, as well as western 
cities that tried to counter the impact of cannons by mounting their own cannons atop city 
walls.
129
 However, these alterations proved ineffective for the medieval walls of 
Constantinople. Kritovoulos explains that during Mehmed’s siege in 1453 the Byzantines 
were unable to fire their own artillery from vantage points on top of the land walls, 
because the recoil from the cannons shook the walls and caused pieces of them to fall. 
Since the Greeks did not want to weaken the integrity of their walls in the face of heavy 
Ottoman bombardment, defensive armament upon Constantinople’s walls was limited to 
handheld ranged weapons during the siege.  
However, the emperor could still place faith in the city’s fortifications even in the 
face of Turkish cannons. In the fifteenth century, assaulting walled cities was still an 
extremely difficult process. Even if city walls crumbled against cannons, soldiers still had 
to make their way through the rubble of those walls and into the city, while at the same 
time being fired upon by the defenders. These conditions would exist well into the late 
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fifteenth century. For example, the Italian city of Volterra withstood an attack by the 
Florentine army in 1472, even after its walls had been destroyed by cannons. The city 
only surrendered because of internal dissent among the population and the efforts of 
Florentine sympathizers.
130
 As a result of these factors, the sultan’s new fortress Rumeli 
Hisar, as well as the fortifications of western cities, heavily influenced Constantine’s 
defensive policies aimed against the Ottoman Turks. 
When the Byzantine attempt to gain the support of first Mara Brankovi , widow 
of Murad II, and then Grand Vizier Candarli Halil Pasha failed, Constantine XI and his 
administration resorted to a series of disjointed, ineffective policies toward the Ottoman 
Empire. The Greeks alternated between antagonism and supplication. They antagonized 
the Turks through their attempt to extort financial resources from Mehmed during the 
Prince Orhan incident. The Greeks then turned to supplication once this effort failed. 
However, the Ottomans no longer wanted to tolerate the existence of an independent 
Constantinople within their territory, capable of causing problems for them in the future, 
which the Orhan incident proved. Therefore, the Ottomans continued their preparations, 
eventually assaulting Constantinople on May 29, 1453. As a result, the failure of personal 
diplomacy led to a series of poor diplomatic and foreign policy actions, and contributed 
to the city’s fall during Constantine XI’s reign. 
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Constantine and the Papacy 
 
 
 The relationship between the Papacy and Constantine XI Palaiologos’ 
administration represents a success in Byzantine personal diplomacy. Even though the 
Papacy sent little aid to Constantinople during its time of crisis, the emperor carefully 
managed relations between the Latins and Greeks amidst the controversial actions of the 
Council of Florence. The emperor accomplished this because he and his court possessed 
the expertise of Cardinal Isidore, the papal legate sent to Constantinople to supervise 
church union. With his advisors giving him almost unanimous consent, Constantine XI 
implemented the union of the churches in Constantinople. In addition, despite the 
unpopular Greek submission to the Papacy at Florence, Constantine and his advisors 
carefully maintained an uneasy peace in the capital between unionist and anti-unionist 
forces.
131
 Furthermore, the emperor appeased the Papacy through a number of overt and 
covert gestures. By foregoing an imperial coronation ceremony in the capital, leaving the 
patriarchate vacant following Gregory III Mammes’ departure to Rome, and only 
publicly proclaiming the union in December 1452, Constantine gained tacit support from 
both sides. As a result of this compromise, the emperor succeeded and gained papal 
support against the Ottomans. Unfortunately for Byzantium, papal reinforcements were 
not enough to save Constantinople. Constantine XI’s efforts, despite the minimal Latin 
response, should be regarded as successful during the Byzantine Empire’s final crisis and 
conflict with the Ottoman Turks. 
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The most significant influence over Byzantine-Papal relations during Constantine 
XI’s reign was established nearly a decade before he took the throne. The Council of 
Florence in the 1430s heavily shaped Greek foreign relations with the Latin Church. Just 
as Michael VIII Palaiologos traveled to the west and offered to reunite the schismatic 
Christian churches to gain military support against an invader, eventually forming a 
short-lived alliance through the Council of Lyons, John VIII hoped to gain western 
military support against the Ottomans. Therefore, the emperor traveled to Italy in 1437 
with a small retinue of churchmen, philosophers, and imperial administrators.
132
 The 
council was initially held in the scenic, fortified city of Ferrara near Venice, the 
Byzantine delegation’s port of arrival. However, the delegates quickly traveled to 




John’s father, Manuel II, tried to convince his son that church union would 
antagonize the Turks, and western promises of military aid would only be illusory. In the 
funeral oration of his brother Theodore, written in 1407, Manuel II describes the possible 
results of any reunion with the Papacy. He explains that while the promise of Latin 
military aid against the Turks had the potential to save Byzantium, the bitter divide that 
church union would cause between the Greeks could lead to conflict or even civil war.
134
 
Manuel II was not the only opponent of union with Rome, as a significant portion of the 
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common Constantinopolitan citizenry fervently defended Orthodoxy against the Latin 
Church. Nonetheless, despite sweltering heat, insufficient supplies and monetary 
resources, the prospect of spending years away from family and loved ones, and little 
domestic support, the Greek delegation began a two year debate regarding union with the 
Papacy. 
 The Council of Florence debated several discrepancies between the Latin and 
Greek Christian practices. The most significant dispute, according to Emperor John VIII, 
concerned the procession of the Holy Spirit.
135
 While the Greeks followed the literal text 
of Christian Scripture, stating that the Holy Spirit only proceeds from the Father, the 
Latins believed in an implied interpretation of Scripture, explaining that the Holy Spirit 
proceeds from both the Father and the Son.
136
 The addition of filioque to the Nicene 
Creed was another point of dispute among the delegates.
137
 The Greeks argued that any 
addition to the Creed after the seven Ecumenical Councils was forbidden.
138
 However, 
the Latins argued that additions to the Creed are prohibited only when they create a 
different faith, not merely when they clarify the traditional one.
139
 Purgatory’s existence 
was also disputed, as the Greeks fervently denied its validity.
140
 The Greeks also opposed 
the use of unleavened bread in the Eucharist, but they eventually relented and viewed it 
as a minor difference of ritual.
141
 The Council of Florence also discussed papal primacy 
among the Christian patriarchates. After several months of debate, the Greeks accepted 
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the Roman see’s primacy, although its actual text in the proclamation was deliberately 
vague.
142
 While each topic was debated and discussed equally between the Greek and 
Latin delegates, the Council of Florence’s results did not reflect that equality. 
 The Latin delegates and Pope Eugenius IV were not interested in compromise 
with the Greeks. They understood that the Byzantine temporal position was tenuous at 
best, and without church union there would be no military aid to Constantinople. In each 
of their responses to the Greek theological positions, the Latin delegates reminded the 
Byzantines that they were in no position to make demands.
143
 The Greek delegates 
quickly understood that the western Church required their signatures affirming the 
Byzantine submission to Rome, not their philosophical and theological positions at the 
council. Sylvester Syropoulos, grand ecclesiarch of Hagia Sophia in Constantinople, 
explains the Greeks’ frustration at the lack of genuine debate at Florence: 
Another day we met again according to custom at the patriarch’s lodgings. We 
debated there the question of union, and the supporters of ‘Latinism’ contented 
themselves with praising the harmony and the ‘peace.’ The bishop of Heraclea 
observed: ‘It would be good if you would furnish us with the declaration which 
you have sent to the Latins. We have heard it only once, though we should have 
seen and examined it several times.’ At once the bishop of Nicaea [Bessarion] 
replied: ‘It would be shameful for you to say you have forgotten it after having 
heard it once. You should not have forgotten what was said and heard here.’ Thus 
he replied to and avoided the request of the bishop of Heraclea. These are the 
kinds of examination and studies that [the Greek] bishops thought they should 




The Council of Florence’s results were predetermined well before John VIII and his 
retinue even arrived in Italy. The Latins prevailed in all theological matters, especially 
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regarding papal supremacy, subtly rewording translated texts to mislead the Greek 
delegates. They granted the Greeks only a small consolation, allowing them to keep their 
traditional church ritual.
145
 In their despair and desire to return to their homes after two 
years of discussion, the Greek delegates all signed the decree of union except for Mark of 
Ephesus, who would take no part in such a one-sided affair.
146
 The emperor and his 
legates then returned to Byzantium, where the union was openly reviled by the general 
clergy and citizenry of Constantinople. Constantine XI Palaiologos inherited these 
implications from the Council of Florence nearly a decade later, and his acknowledged 
obligation to implement them greatly influenced his foreign relations with the Papacy. 
 The Byzantine submission to Rome at the Council of Florence, and Emperor 
Constantine XI’s efforts to execute it within Constantinople during his reign, came solely 
as a result of Ottoman pressure toward the empire. The Orthodox Church, which carried a 
large amount of power and prestige in the east eve as the Byzantine state declined, had 
little interest in surrender to Roman supremacy and doctrine.
147
 Therefore, the Byzantines 
pursued union solely because of the emperor’s and his court’s wishes. Without the 
Turkish threat to Constantinople, the Council of Florence would not have occurred. The 
Papacy, as a result of previous antagonisms between the groups since the Council of 
Lyons in 1274, realized that John VIII’s overtures came because of Byzantium’s crisis. 
However, the pope used this to gain religious concessions from the Greeks. 
 Just as the Council of Florence influenced the emperor’s policy toward the Roman 
pontiff, the status of the Papacy throughout the fifteenth century also played an important 
role in Papal-Byzantine relations. However, Constantine XI faced a Papacy that had lost a 
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significant amount of the prestige it gained during the High Middle Ages. During the 
fourteenth century, nepotism, as well as the Papacy’s tenure at Avignon, drained the 
papal treasury of funds and lowered its stature among Christian leaders.
148
 In addition, 
the election of several rival popes in Rome, Pisa, and Avignon split the western 
Christians into rival factions. The papal Curia made several efforts to repair the Papacy’s 
reputation which culminated in the Council of Constance, opened in November 1414. 
After three years of debate and negotiation, twenty three cardinals and thirty other 
electors deposed the three competing popes and elected Martin V.
149
 However, the city of 
Rome required the bulk of Martin’s attentions, as it had descended into lawlessness and 
ruin during the years of the rival popes in Avignon and Pisa.
150
 Even after he had restored 
order to Rome, Martin was concerned with several major conflicts throughout Western 
Europe. The Hundred Years’ War between France and England, the Spanish reconquista 
from the Moors, and the German civil wars occupied the pope for the rest of his life.
151
 In 
addition, Italy was in a constant state of upheaval due to virulent outbreaks of the plague 
and political intrigues among the quarrelling princes.
152
 Even though Martin V 
recognized that the eastern Christians suffered numerous defeats at the hands of the 
Ottomans, the conflicts throughout Italy and Western Europe drained his resources.
153
 
Therefore, he was unable to provide significant assistance for Byzantium during his 
tenure as pope. 
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 After the accession of Pope Eugenius IV in 1431, the Papacy faced a new crisis 
that distracted it from helping the Greeks. The Conciliar movement, the belief that the 
ultimate church authority rested in the decisions of church councils rather than the pope 
himself, challenged papal supremacy.
154
 Supported by French and German clergy and 
elites, the Conciliar movement undermined support for papal directives throughout 
Western Europe.
155
 While Eugenius IV tried to focus the western princes’ attention on the 
eastern crisis through the Council of Florence, his decreasing influence garnered support 
primarily from the Italian clergy. After the Latins’ success at the council, Eugenius’ 
prestige temporarily increased and helped him to convince the Hungarians and Venetians 
to assist the Greeks. However, when the crusade failed and the Turks destroyed the 
crusaders at Varna in 1444, the pope’s prestige once again decreased.
156
 His successor, 
Nicholas V, faced similar temporal problems upon his accession in March 1447.
157
 The 
Romans opposed his municipal administration, and Italian princes constantly challenged 
his temporal authority. While he zealously presided over the Conciliar movement’s defeat 
at Basel and Lausanne, his enthusiasm did not extend toward assisting the eastern 
Christians.
158
 Nicholas V did not believe that the Ottoman Turks possessed the strength 
necessary to destroy the Byzantine Empire, and continually disregarded information 
relating Greek defeats in the east.
159
 As a result, Constantine XI faced a Papacy that 
possessed a decreased amount of influence among the western princes, as well as a pope 
who did not fully understand the extent of the Ottoman threat to Byzantium. 
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Constantine XI Palaiologos’ actions toward the Papacy were heavily influenced 
by his courtiers’ opinions. His advisors, in contrast to their positions toward the Ottoman 
Turks, generally agreed on a Byzantine policy toward the Papacy. Each of the councilors’ 
positions revolved around the Council of Florence and its execution in Constantinople. 
The megadux Lucas Notaras held a pragmatic position, particularly concerning the 
implementation of church union. George Sphrantzes explains that his desire to save the 
city from the Ottomans at all costs clearly motivated his position toward the Roman 
see.
160
 He understood that the empire’s military salvation could only come from the Latin 
Christians, and that the Papacy was the only force that could mobilize them.
161
 Therefore, 
he advised the emperor to take the necessary steps in Constantinople to implement the 
union of the churches proclaimed at Florence. Notaras also used his position and 
influence to advertise these benefits of church union to many courtiers and prominent 
Constantinopolitan citizens, especially after papal legate Cardinal Isidore arrived in the 
city in 1452.
162
 While the chronicler Doukas quotes the megadux saying that “it would be 
better to see the turban of the Turks reigning in the center of the City than the Latin 
miter,” subsequent authors have often taken this statement out of context and portray him 
as an opponent of church union.
163
 Notaras most likely made such a comment as a 
frustrated response to the intransigence of some Italians residing in Constantinople, rather 
than as a mark of his anti-unionist sentiments.
164
 In fact, Lucas Notaras was an extremely 
passionate and vocal supporter of church union in Emperor Constantine XI’s circle of 
advisors. 
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 Constantine’s close friend and councilor George Sphrantzes was equally as 
pragmatic concerning relations with the pope and church union. The First Lord of the 
Imperial Wardrobe was not concerned with religious dogmas, but merely gaining papal 
military assistance for Constantinople. In his chronicle of events surrounding the fall of 
Constantinople, Sphrantzes relates a parable describing his beliefs: 
Allow me to make use of a parable. For many years I and some others have been 
accustomed to meet in the Church of Saint Sophia by our Middle Way, the broad 
spacious street of our City. Some time later other people discovered another road 
that leads to the same church, as they say, and urged me: ‘Come also by this road 
which we discovered; we know that your way is old and fine and known to us 
from the beginning with you, but the one we have just found is a good road also.’ 
So I hear certain individuals assert that the new road is the correct way, while 
others maintain the opposite. Why can I not say: ‘Go in peace and love to Saint 
Sophia by whatever road you please; but I will use the road I have taken with you 




He also realized that there were grave risks inherent in any church union. He believed 
that the Turks feared any rapprochement between the Christians and the subsequent 
military alliance that would result. Until the Council of Florence, with the exception of 
the failed Crusade of Nicopolis in 1396, the Turks seized territory from Byzantium 
without fear of reprisal, since the Greek military was extremely weak and the stronger 
Latin Christians were unlikely to aid schismatics.  
After church union, the Ottomans needed to exercise more caution. The mere 
proclamation of union in Rome led to the Crusade of Varna in 1444, and a Greek 
proclamation of union in Constantinople could have led to another. However, Sphrantzes 
regarded the union’s proposed military benefits as worth the risk.
166
 If carried out 
carefully and discretely, he believed it would succeed. He explains: “I wish that the union 
of the churches had come about properly, even if it had cost me one of my eyes. But I 
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said it because the synod was the single most important cause for the attack that the 
impious [Ottomans] launched against our City, which resulted in the siege, our 
enslavement, and our great misfortunes.”
167
 George Sphrantzes was so fervent of an 
advocate for church union that he recommended the papal legate Cardinal Isidore for the 
recently vacant patriarchate in Constantinople, after Patriarch Gregory III fled to Rome, 
but the emperor dismissed his recommendation.
168
 Through these actions, George 
Sphrantzes advised the emperor to celebrate the union of the churches to improve 
relations between Byzantium and Rome. 
Unlike Lucas Notaras and George Sphrantzes, Constantine’s close friend John 
Kantakouzenos and Grand Domestic Andronikos Kantakouzenos advocated Byzantine 
submission to the Papacy on religious grounds. While they also believed that the military 
union would significantly decrease the Ottomans’ pressure upon Constantinople, the two 
advisors viewed this as a consequence of adopting the Roman faith.
169
 Andronikos was so 
fervent in his beliefs that in 1437, John VIII sent him as an emissary to the Serbians 
asking them to send a delegation to the Council of Florence.
170
 When they refused the 
offer, both he and John Kantakouzenos became fervent opponents of the Serbians, 
labeling them as heretics.
171
 Following Constantine’s accession the throne, the two 
advisors consistently explained to the emperor that commitment to church union was 
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spiritually correct, and would bring temporal rewards for the empire as well.
172
 Both 
Andronikos and John joined their voices to those of Notaras and Sphrantzes in supporting 
union with the Papacy. 
 Two influential churchmen also made their way into Constantine XI’s retinue in 
order to advise him on the proper course regarding union with the Papacy, joining the 
ranks of his other unionist councilors. Bessarion, Bishop of Nicaea, was one of these 
clerics. The bishop was, according to the historian Doukas, “the most erudite of the 
hierarchs” who attended the Council of Florence.
173
 His eloquence, learned status, and 
persuasiveness at the council convinced Pope Eugenius IV that he should be made a 
cardinal.
174
 In fact, his subsequent theological contributions to Latin Christendom so 
impressed the other cardinals that he was nearly elected to the papal throne in 1455.
175
 As 
a result, his stature in the west added significant credibility to his messages to 
Constantine XI supporting Byzantine assent to the union of the churches. Bessarion spent 
little time in the beleaguered capital after 1439, but he communicated with the emperor 
and the elites in the city frequently.
176
 Therefore, despite his distance from 
Constantinople, Cardinal Bessarion significantly influenced Constantine XI’s decisions 
regarding the Papacy and implementing the Council of Florence’s decisions. 
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 The other churchman who advised the emperor on the proper course of action 
toward the Papacy exercised his influence while in Constantinople itself. He was also the 
integral figure in Constantine XI’s strategy of personal diplomacy. Isidore, Cardinal of 
All Russia, arrived in the imperial capital in November 1452, with a company of 200 
Neapolitan archers, as the papal legate to Byzantium.
177
 Like Bessarion, Isidore was an 
intelligent and eloquent man, first elevated from monastic life to become bishop of Kiev 
before attending the Council of Florence in John VIII’s delegation.
178
 Pope Eugenius IV 
was also impressed with Isidore, elevating him to the cardinalship following the council. 
When the Kievans rioted against Isidore and the union upon his return, Pope Nicholas V 
designated him the papal legate to Constantinople.
179
 The cardinal was an equally shrewd 
politician as he was a talented theologian and orator. He understood that Constantine 
faced open rebellion in the capital if the union’s implementation did not proceed 
carefully. However, Isidore continually pressured the emperor to undertake small steps 
toward this goal as the weeks of his visit progressed.
180
 The cardinal had learned from his 
experience in Kiev, and was confident that union could succeed in Constantinople. He 
assured the emperor that once church union had occurred, the military aid he requested 
would arrive. Instead of returning to the Curia when the Ottoman pressure on 
Constantinople increased shortly after his arrival, the cardinal remained in the city and 
used his military knowledge to assist with the defense.
181
 Cardinal Isidore remained in 
close contact with Pope Nicholas V during his time in the capital, constantly reporting on 
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the emperor’s progress toward completing the union of the churches.
182
 Since 
Constantine realized that further western military aid hinged upon his reports to the pope, 
Isidore’s recommendations held a significant amount of influence over the emperor’s 
decisions regarding Rome. 
Demetrios Palaiologos Kantakouzenos, Constantine’s cousin and mesazon 
through his and John VIII’s reigns, remained aloof from the debate within the Byzantine 
court over union.
183
 The mesazon’s delicate nature necessitated his passivity during court 
debate and discussion during Constantine’s reign. He intimately understood that the 
general population of Constantinople virulently opposed the submission to the Papacy, 
but remained loyal to his former master John VIII’s faith in the union’s ability to save 
Byzantium.
184
 He did explain to Constantine the extent to which the Constantinopolitans 
opposed church union, but did not elaborate upon any plans to implement it in the city. 
Therefore, Kantakouzenos remained virtually silent on the subject in the emperor’s 
presence and avoided any contradictions arising from his delicate position within the 
imperial administration. 
One of the few elites in Constantine’s inner circle to oppose rapprochement with 
the Papacy was the emperor’s younger brother, Demetrios Palaiologos Porphyrogenitos. 
The prince, who became a co-despot of the Morea following Constantine’s accession to 
the imperial throne, adopted this position after attending the Council of Florence with his 
elder brother John VIII in 1437 and 1438.
185
 Demetrios Palaiologos did not oppose 
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church union on spiritual grounds. Instead, he recognized that most of the 
Constantinopolitan citizenry would oppose any attack upon their faith, leaving them 
searching for a leader that would exemplify their beliefs. His opportunism manifested 
itself soon after the Council of Florence’s conclusion. Proclaiming himself the defender 
of Orthodoxy and the leader of the anti-unionists, Demetrios laid siege to Constantinople 
with a company of Turkish mercenaries in April 1442.
186
 While he did not possess a 
sufficient number of troops to force the city, Demetrios hoped that the anti-unionists in 
the city would depose John VIII and offer him the throne. This rebellious act relegated 
Demetrios to insignificance within the imperial administration until September 1, 1449, 
when he became co-despot of the Morea with his brother Thomas. Before he could rally 
the anti-unionists to any seditious acts against Constantine, the latter sent him to Mistra in 
the Morea.
187
 This act effectively ended Demetrios’ influence over Constantine’s court 
and advisors, as well as any control he held over the emperor’s policy toward the Papacy. 
Therefore, Despot Demetrios’ anti-unionist opinions held little authority over Emperor 
Constantine XI’s actions. 
Since most of his advisors wanted to implement union with the Papacy, the 
emperor undertook several significant actions designed to please Rome and upset the 
Constantinopolitan population as little as possible. Constantine knew that he had little 
time to waste. Nearly a decade had passed between the Council of Florence and 
Constantine’s accession to the throne, and the Greeks still had not publicly proclaimed 
the union. With each passing month, the Papacy grew more impatient, expecting results 
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from Byzantium. In a letter to the emperor dated September 27, 1451, Pope Nicholas V 
expresses his irritation: 
The Greeks cannot really assume that the Roman pontiff and the whole Western 
Church… are so bereft of intelligence as not to realize why in this delay the 
excuses keep coming – they understand, but they bear with it… But if, however, 
you refuse to maintain this decree among your people, you will compel us to 




Constantine and his government realized that they needed to take action in order to secure 
papal support, but they faced another crucial problem. Most of the lesser elites and nobles 
outside Constantine’s inner circle fervently opposed church union. The emperor already 
had difficulties controlling and subordinating the Constantinopolitan elites, as they often 
refused to give up their wealth to the city’s defense. Leonard of Chios explains: “Again, 
what traitors were among the Greeks, what greedy betrayers of their country! Their needy 
Emperor begged them again and again to lend him money to pay his soldiers, but they 
swore that they had none, because the poverty of the times had exhausted their resources. 
Yet their enemies [the Turks] later found wealth enough among them.”
189
 The Venetian 
physician Nicolò Barbaro confirms the bishop’s account, and even explains that these 
Greek elites stubbornly refused any imperial initiatives regarding their wealth and 
privileges: “The Emperor was very poor, and asked his barons to lend him money, but 
they excused themselves because they had none; the Turks, however, found a great deal 
of money – in fact, thirty thousand ducats were found in the possession of one of these 
gentlemen. The Emperor was [also] advised not to raise taxes at such a time of 
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 The Byzantine nobility did not challenge Constantine’s right to the throne, 
but they fervently defended their wealth and privilege. 
While Constantine could have devoted his attention to the insubordinate elites in 
Constantinople, he instead refused to divert his focus from the Ottomans’ external threat. 
Leonard of Chios explains: “The Emperor lacked firmness, and those who neglected to 
obey his orders were neither chastised nor put to death. So each one followed his own 
inclinations, and they soothed the Emperor’s anger with flatteries in their usual way. That 
good man, so wickedly mocked by his own subjects, preferred to pretend that he did not 
see the wrongs that were being done.”
191
 As a result, the tensions between Constantine 
and the city’s elites made the emperor’s efforts in proclaiming church union extremely 
difficult. 
 In order to personally distance himself from the union before slowly 
implementing it, Constantine XI refused to partake in an official religious coronation 
ceremony. Traditionally, a new emperor would be crowned by the patriarch of 
Constantinople in Hagia Sophia shortly after his arrival in the city. However, Patriarch 
Gregory III Mammes was a committed unionist and Constantine did not want to be 
overtly perceived as supporting the unionists’ position. In addition, he did not possess the 
financial resources necessary to prepare a lavish and traditional ceremony in Hagia 
Sophia.
192
 He satisfied himself with the private and civil coronation ceremony performed 
at Mistra on January 6, 1449.
193
 Two emissaries from Constantinople traveled to the 
Morea, informed Constantine of his brother’s death, and crowned him emperor on the 
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Constantinopolitan people’s behalf in the palace of the despots.
194
 However, the lack of a 
proper coronation ceremony did cast some doubt over Constantine’s imperial legitimacy. 
The historian Doukas explains in his chronicle that John VIII was the last true Roman 
emperor because Constantine did not participate in a religious coronation.
195
 However, 
only a minor segment of the citizenry disputed the emperor’s legitimacy in 
Constantinople. George Sphrantzes explains that with or without a proper coronation, the 
Constantinopolitans acclaimed Constantine emperor.
196
 While the Papacy gently urged 
Constantine to undergo the coronation, the emperor continually delayed claiming that the 
Ottoman threat required his immediate attention.
197
 Patriarch Gregory III Mammes’ 
departure to Rome in August 1451 simplified the emperor’s problem. Gregory chafed at 
the lack of commitment shown to the agreements made at Florence and retired to private 
life.
198
 With the patriarchate vacant, Constantine indefinitely postponed his coronation 
until the immediacy of the Ottoman threat consumed the Papacy’s attention. Therefore, 
he placated the anti-unionists within Constantinople without offending or antagonizing 
the Papacy.
199
 This was one of Constantine’s first actions designed to maintain peace in 
Constantinople and gain military support from the pope. 
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 Another tactic Constantine XI attempted in his quest for military aid from Rome 
involved his father’s tactic of personal diplomacy. Manuel II traveled to England and 
France in the beginning of the fifteenth century, and was in constant contact with the 
Papacy, attempting to gain military assistance.
200
 However, without church union, 
Manuel II believed that his efforts would not succeed. He received many promises, as he 
explains in a letter to the priest Euthymius in the summer of 1401: 
Now, as long as our negotiations were stalled at the stage of favorable promises, 
and these from men who make them most readily, the awareness that your 
salvation depended upon deeds, not words, made me completely numb, hand, 
tongue, and mind, although I wanted to intone the hymn of victory. Above all I 
had been afraid that, quite unawares, I might be overcome by grief if I should try 




Manuel II echoes these beliefs in a letter to Demetrios Chrysoloras, one of his advisors in 
Constantinople, later in the year. Even though the Papacy made promises to assist the 
Greeks, they had no incentive to fulfill them as long as the schism remained.
202
 After the 
Council of Florence, the emperor believed that another journey to the west would elicit 
the promised aid. He was still admired throughout Christian Europe for his daring attacks 
against the Ottomans while despot of the Morea.
203
 Therefore, he believed that a personal 
appeal would succeed with the western rulers. However, Constantine was foremost a 
soldier. He refused to leave Constantinople while rumors of an impending Ottoman 
attack abounded in the city.
204
 Instead of traveling to the pope himself, Constantine asked 
his brother Thomas, co-despot of the Morea with his brother Demetrios, to travel to Italy 
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 Since Thomas was a member of the imperial family, held the prestigious 
rank of despot, and came at his brother’s request, Constantine believed he would be a 
suitable replacement. However, he politely refused, fearing his brother Demetrios would 
strike against his lands when he left. Instead, the emperor sent Andronikos Bryennios 
Leontaris to the Papacy in April 1451, where he would remain as a spokesman for the 
Greek cause, and report relevant information back to Constantine.
206
 Even though 
Andronikos could not rouse the Papacy to aid Constantinople on his own, he did provide 
the Byzantines with crucial information regarding the Roman see under Pope Nicholas V. 
 Constantine XI Palaiologos’ major action to gain favor with the Papacy involved 
proclaiming the union of the churches in Hagia Sophia. The emperor seriously debated 
this act before relenting to Cardinal Isidore’s request. He felt no spiritual need to 
proclaim the church union in the great church, and he feared a backlash from the anti-
unionists within Constantinople.
207
 However, the emperor knew that finally proclaiming 
union publicly in the capital would greatly improve his standing with the Papacy and 
finally bring Byzantium aid and he thus gave his consent.
208
 The Italian and Greek clergy 
celebrated church union on December 12, 1452, commemorating the names of Pope 
Nicholas V and the departed Patriarch Gregory III Mammes in the liturgy.
209
 Before the 
service, Constantine and his advisors took several precautionary measures to prevent any 
riots or other violent acts by the anti-unionist party. According to Sphrantzes, Constantine 
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did not force the population to attend. In fact, “whoever was willing would pronounce the 
commemoration in Saint Sophia; the rest would incur no blame and remain peaceful.”
210
 
Constantine also assured the citizenry that complete submission to the Papacy would be 
only temporary. Doukas explains that the people “agreed to the Article of Union with the 
understanding that, once the Turkish threat had passed and peace was restored, a number 
of scholars would gather to study the articles and correct whatever was not in complete 
accordance with the true faith.”
211
 Fortunately for the emperor, these measures 
succeeded.  
The proclamation of union caused great lamentation in the city, but no 
violence.
212
 Instead, the anti-unionists merely avoided Hagia Sophia, which Cardinal 
Isidore had transformed into a Latin cathedral. Doukas writes: “From that day on which 
the Union had supposedly taken place in the Great Church [Hagia Sophia], the 
Constantinopolitans shunned it as though it were a synagogue of Jews, and neither 
oblation nor burnt offering nor censing took place inside.”
213
 Nonetheless, the 
proclamation liturgy satisfied Cardinal Isidore, who wrote to Pope Nicholas V shortly 
after the ceremony explaining merely that the Greeks had finally proclaimed union with 
Rome. Isidore, sympathetic to the Greeks plight, did not inform the pope of the dissention 
within Constantinople or the emperor’s theological apathy.
214
 As a result, Constantine 
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succeeded in convincing the Papacy that the Greeks were serious about church union, 
without overwhelmingly alienating his citizenry. 
Emperor Constantine XI also delicately managed the problem concerning the 
vacant patriarchate following Gregory III Mammes’ departure in April 1451. He believed 
that appointing a new patriarch risked shattering the tenuous peace he created in 
Constantinople and was unnecessary until someone defeated the Ottoman threat to the 
city. While the proclamation of union in Hagia Sophia in December 1452 implied that 
Gregory III could return to the patriarchal throne, he declined and remained sequestered 
in Italy.
215
 Even when his close friend George Sphrantzes recommended Cardinal Isidore 
for the patriarchal throne as a way to gain the Roman see’s assistance, Constantine 
refused to act. The Constantinopolitan citizenry had not yet rioted against church union, 
but any provocation could break the emperor’s fragile peace.
216
 The proclamation of 
church union had come close to inciting riots, but its implementation was absolutely 
necessary for papal military support. Filling the vacant patriarchate was not as necessary. 
Instead, Constantine again explained that he could not focus upon such matters while the 
Ottomans stood at the city gates.
217
 Once the impending crisis ended, he would decide 
upon a new patriarch. The Papacy relented and allowed the emperor to wait. Again, 
Constantine XI successfully avoided conflict with his own people while bolstering his 
position with Rome. 
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Constantine and his advisors also relied upon leniency to maintain peace within 
the city while implementing the union of the churches. The emperor lowered the tensions 
within Constantinople by allowing the citizenry to voice their dissent freely. Constantine 
and his inner circle refused to take harsh actions against those residents that did not 
believe in union. Bishop Leonard of Chios, an assistant to Cardinal Isidore, explains that 
the emperor would not punish vocal monks for their beliefs: “Indeed, if he had only 
shaken off his timidity, he would have punished their [the monks] deceitful pretense of 
faith; for he who spurns God and seeks to please man will surely be confounded. If only 
they had been repressed, as they should have been, they would not have spread this 
pestilential infection.”
218
 Doukas agrees with the bishop, describing the emperor’s actions 
toward anti-unionist nuns: “Those nuns, who considered themselves to be pure and 
dedicated to God in Orthodoxy, with common resolve and in accord with their teacher 
Gennadios [a prominent anti-unionist], and with the abbots and the confessors and the 
remaining priests and laymen, cried aloud the anathema.”
219
 Even though the dissidents 
opposed church union, many were grateful to the emperor for his leniency, understood 
his position, and pledged their loyalty to the emperor and Constantinople. Doukas details 
this in his chronicle: “The Constantinopolitans, in their despair, had been saying, ‘Would 
that the City were delivered into the hands of the Latins, who call upon Christ and the 
Theotokos [Mother of God], and not thrown into the clutches of the infidel.”
220
 As a 
result, Constantine provided means for dissidents to voice their opinions while retaining 
their loyalty to the empire. The papal legate Isidore, along with his assistant Leonard of 
Chios, expressed their concern over the emperor’s leniency, but understood that he 
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needed to diffuse the tensions over church union.
221
 Through his flexibility, Emperor 
Constantine further maintained the peace between the unionists and anti-unionists during 
his quest for papal aid. 
Constantine’s and his administration’s efforts to secure papal assistance for 
Constantinople during its time of crisis were a partial success. While the Papacy faced 
several challenges in Western Europe that occupied many of its resources, Pope Nicholas 
V aided Byzantium in a variety of ways. First, Constantine’s implementation of church 
union led the Papacy to recommend another crusade to save the Greeks. Aeneas Sylvius 
Piccolomini, later Pope Pius II, explains in his autobiography that the Curia wanted to 
rouse the western princes to defend Constantinople.
222
 While matters in the west 
prevented Nicholas from organizing a general crusade, he did exhort all Christians to 
individually travel to Constantinople to take part in its defense against impending assault. 
One of these enterprising westerners was Giovanni Giustiniani Longo. Giustiniani was a 
Genoese adventurer experienced in siege warfare.
223
 Doukas describes his entry into 
Constantinople: “From Genoa there also arrived Giovanni Longo Giustiniani in two huge 
ships which were carrying a large supply of excellent military equipment and well-armed 
youthful Genoese soldiers full of martial passion. This Giovanni was a very adept 
tactician in the deployment of allied military forces. The emperor welcomed him warmly 
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and honored him with the rank of Protostrator.”
224
 Giustiniani was one of several private 
Italian and German soldiers that traveled to Constantinople’s defense. 
 While not enough to save the city, Pope Nicholas V also provided military forces 
and supplies for Constantinople. Troop enrollment and resource procurement in Italy 
were long and arduous tasks, as recruiting, training, equipping, and shipping military 
units and supplies took a significant amount of time. The first troops arrived in October 
1451, in the company of Cardinal Isidore. On his way from Rome, Isidore recruited with 
papal funds more than 200 crossbowmen and gunners skilled with gunpowder weaponry 
from Naples. The cardinal knew that his gesture would be appreciated by the beleaguered 
emperor, as “his military escort, small though it was, was a token that the pope would 
send practical assistance to a people that recognized his authority.”
225
 Once the Ottoman 
encirclement of Constantinople began in earnest (in late 1452), the Papacy shifted its 
focus from sending troops to sending supplies for the citizenry. Using its limited 
resources, the Papacy outfitted several transports of grain to feed Constantinople. The 
most notable of these convoys traveled to Constantinople in April 1453. The pope filled 
one of Constantine’s imperial galleys with grain in Sicily at his own expense, and hired 
three Genoese vessels to carry other assorted provisions to the city.
226
 Despite dozens of 
Ottoman vessels surrounding them in the Bosphorus, the four ships fought their way into 
Constantinople’s protected harbor, supplying the city with foodstuffs and ammunition. 
Even though the Papacy’s troops and supplies did not prevent Constantinople’s capture 
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by Mehmed II’s superior army, the shipments that the Papacy provided were a direct 
result of Constantine XI’s competence. 
 Emperor Constantine XI Palaiologos successfully maintained cordial relations 
with the Papacy throughout his reign by skillfully implementing the union of the 
churches. The emperor gained confidence from his advisors’ solidarity regarding the 
union’s usefulness, which came from the expert advice provided by Cardinal Isidore. 
These also emboldened his subsequent actions in Constantinople. By implementing 
portions of the union when convenient, Constantine pleased Pope Nicholas V and his 
legate in Constantinople, Isidore. In addition, the emperor’s delicate implementation of 
union forestalled any rioting by the large anti-unionist faction in the city. While papal aid 
to Constantinople did not prevent the city’s capture by the Ottomans, the emperor was 






Constantine and the Venetians 
 
 
 Constantine XI’s relationship with Venetian interests in Constantinople before the 
siege also represents a partial success in Byzantine diplomacy. While the Venetian 
government sent only a token amount of aid to the emperor, Constantine and his court 
successfully mobilized the Venetian population within Constantinople to support 
Byzantium against the Ottoman Turks during the crisis. Constantine realized that the 
Venetian Senate would send him little aid. The city was involved in its own conflicts over 
Italian hegemony. He had antagonized Venetian interests during his tenure as despot of 
the Morea, the Venetian doge mistrusted Greeks in general, and his advisors, on the 
whole, mistrusted the Venetian government. As a result, Constantine focused his pleas 
for help upon the merchants, ship captains, and other Venetian residents and travelers in 
the Byzantine capital. Instead of fleeing before the Turkish siege, a significant portion of 
Constantinople’s Venetian population remained in the city, risking death, to aid in its 
defense because Emperor Constantine convinced them to do so. As a result of this local 
support, despite the Venetian government’s refusal to provide significant assistance to 
Constantinople, Constantine XI Palaiologos’ diplomacy toward the Venetians was 
successful. 
 Before discussing the Byzantine’s relations with Venice, it is important to place 
the Italian republic into its historical context in the fifteenth century. While crisis loomed 
in the east between Byzantium and the Ottomans, the Venetians prepared for a 
confrontation with their neighbors over hegemony in northern Italy. As a primarily 
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maritime republic, Venice wanted to secure food supplies for its citizens and lumber for 
its shipwrights.
227
 However, the Venetian subjugation of towns within its hinterland 
irritated and antagonized the other major powers in northern Italy: Lombardy and 
Florence. While the Italians avoided open war in the early fifteenth century, the accession 
of Francesco Foscari to the Venetian dogeship fundamentally altered the tenuous truce in 
northern Italy. Foscari, a prominent member of the hawkish faction eager to exert its 
dominance over the Milanese and Florentines, plunged Venice into war with Milan by 
1423.
228
 This disastrous conflict extended throughout the next thirty years, drawing vital 
Venetian military assets into the Po River valley region and away from the Levant and 
Constantinople.  
The Venetians did answer the pope’s call for a crusade against the Ottomans in 
1443, allying and cooperating with the Hungarians. However, the crusade’s catastrophic 
failure at Varna in late 1444 soured the Venetian crusading spirit. In fact, the Venetians 
concluded peace and a new trade agreement with the Ottomans shortly after the crusade’s 
dissolution. While the Venetians took Ottoman military strength very seriously after 
Varna, their main concern in concluding a new treaty with Sultan Murad involved 
gaining an advantage over the other Italian trading republics in their territories.
229
 After 
concluding this new trade agreement, the Venetian government viewed any negative 
actions toward the Turks with skepticism. They were not eager to endanger their new 
agreement or antagonize their new trading partners, especially with other Italian city-
states eager to take their place trading in the Ottoman realms. As a result of these issues, 
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Emperor Constantine XI Palaiologos faced a highly distracted and disinterested Venetian 
government in the fifteenth century during his time of crisis. 
 During his reign, Constantine relied heavily upon his court’s advice when 
negotiating and communicating with the Venetians, both in Venice and in 
Constantinople. However, only a few members of the emperor’s court possessed any 
experience with Venetian interests or opinions on any proper actions toward them. 
Among the experienced advisors, the distant Venetian government elicited feelings of 
hostility and disdain from many of his councilors. However, these councilors frequently 
developed close, friendly relationships with the Venetian merchants, sea captains, and 
other artisans and traders traveling and living within the Byzantine capital.  
Megadux Lucas Notaras developed the strongest relationships with both the 
Venetian government and Venetian travelers and citizens in Constantinople. He built 
close ties with the government in Italy by depositing much of his considerable fortune in 
Venetian banks, and even settled his three daughters in the city.
230
 In addition, Notaras 
eventually gained Venetian citizenship, proving his connections to influential leaders and 
businessmen within the republic.
231
 The megadux also cultivated close ties with the 
Venetian merchants and trader captains that frequented Constantinople. In order to gain 
their favor, Notaras frequently devoted Byzantine resources to developing infrastructure 
and effecting repairs in the city’s Venetian quarter along the Golden Horn. For example, 
Lucas Notaras supervised and financed the repair and expansion of harbors in the Golden 
Horn to accommodate larger Venetian galleys and merchantmen in 1446.
232
 The 
Venetians in Constantinople also favored him because of his antagonism toward one of 
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the Venetians’ main Italian rivals: the Genoese. Before the crisis, Notaras clearly favored 
Venetian interests over those of the Genoese in nearby Galata, but his bias clearly 
showed during the Ottoman crisis and siege of Constantinople. For example, the Genoese 
soldier of fortune and the commander of the Christian forces at the walls, Giovanni 
Giustiniani and Lucas Notaras entered into heated debates over the correct placement of 
military units and defensive artillery against the Turks. The megadux attempted to 
frustrate Giustiniani’s plans at every step, though.
233
 As a result of these actions, Lucas 
Notaras possessed a significant amount of respect from Venetians, both in Italy and in 
Constantinople. He worked feverishly to convince them to cooperate with Constantine 
XI’s plans and advised the emperor of their desires and capabilities to defend the city. 
While Lucas Notaras possessed a friendly rapport with the Venetian government 
and citizens within Constantinople, First Lord of the Imperial Wardrobe George 
Sphrantzes was skeptical and mistrusted Venetians. Sphrantzes particularly scorned the 
hawkish Venetian doge, Francesco Foscari, characterizing him as vengeful, deceitful, and 
thoroughly anti-Greek in his sentiments. In his Chronicon Minus, George Sphrantzes 
describes a supposed marital arrangement between the doge’s daughter and Constantine, 
during his tenure as despot of the Morea.
234
 Foscari wished to unite Venetian possessions 
in the Morea, mainly Modon and Coron, with Constantine’s realm in the peninsula’s 
northwest. In addition, he promised the poverty-stricken despot with “a handsome 
dowry,” which Constantine could not deny in his struggle against the Turks and the 
Achaean lords adjacent to his realm.
235
 However, Sphrantzes claims that upon gaining the 
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throne, Constantine rightfully cancelled the agreement with Foscari on the grounds that 
imperial dignity could not permit a lowly Venetian to become Roman empress at 
Constantinople.
236
 After Constantine cancelled the agreement, Sphrantzes claims that 
Foscari became a bitter enemy of Byzantium, doing nothing to save it from the Ottomans. 
Since George Sphrantzes believed that ending such a marriage agreement was proper and 
justified, he vilified the doge for his supposed bitterness and extended his disdain toward 
most Venetians. While Donald Nicol refutes the legitimacy of this proposed marriage, 
Sphrantzes’ inclusion of it within his narrative is significant.
237
 This example shows his 
hostility toward the Venetians and his desire to legitimize that hostility through this story. 
In addition, George Sphrantzes’ diplomatic missions around the Aegean and Black Seas 
limited his exposure to Venetians living within Constantinople. Therefore, he could not 
provide Emperor Constantine with detailed advice on a proper course of action toward 
them. 
The Grand Domestic Andronikos Palaiologos Kantakouzenos, much like Lucas 
Notaras, possessed considerable knowledge of Venice and Venetian negotiating tactics. 
Kantakouzenos represented the empire in several treaty negotiations with Venice. His 
most notable Venetian diplomatic achievement was the commercial treaty in 1448, where 
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he personally represented Emperor John VIII.
238
 While possessing more knowledge of 
the Venetians than George Sphrantzes, he shared the ambassador’s opinions of Venice. 
Kantakouzenos recognized that the Venetian doge would act in the republic’s best 
interest, whether that meant cooperating with Byzantium or with the Ottomans to gain 
economic and political advantages over his rivals. In addition, the memories of the 
Venetians’ role in the Fourth Crusade of 1204 were foremost in Greek minds, especially 
that of Andronikos. This traumatic event, ingrained in the Byzantine collective memory, 
fundamentally characterized Greek relations with Venice. After Venetian ships and 
soldiers assaulted and captured Constantinople, and subsequently stripped the city of its 
wealth, the Greeks were extremely wary of trusting them ever again.
239
 Kantakouzenos 
understood that Byzantium needed allies if it was to survive a Turkish attack.
240
 
However, he did not believe that the Venetian government would be the ally that the 
Greeks required. While the Venetian residents of Constantinople might act to defend the 
city against an Ottoman assault, he believed that the republic itself would not actively 
support Byzantium during its time of extreme crisis.  
While Notaras, Andronikos Kantakouzenos, and Sphrantzes were among 
Constantine’s most trusted advisors, his most knowledgeable and useful associate when 
interacting with the Venetians was their baille in 1452 and 1453, Girolamo Minotto.
241
 
He was also the successful target of Constantine XI’s personal diplomacy. While the 
previous baille acted mainly as a communications medium between the Venetian 
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government in Italy and the emperor, Minotto took an active role in Constantine’s inner 
circle.
242
 Initially interested in balancing Venetian relations between Constantinople and 
the Ottoman sultanate, the destruction of a Venetian merchant galley by the fortress 
Rumeli Hisar completely altered his orientation.
243
 The baille realized what this action 
implied for Venetian trading throughout the Aegean, and he wanted to do anything he 
could to keep its control independent of the Ottomans. Such an act placed the Ottomans 
in a state of war with Venice, but the republic wanted to pursue a diplomatic solution to 
the situation.
244
 However, Minotto realized the futility of negotiation with the Turks. 
Their recent peace and trade agreement had not prevented the Venetian galley’s 
destruction in the Bosporus, and the baille had little reason to expect any new agreements 
to fair any better than the current arrangement. Therefore, with few prospects of 
assistance from the Venetian government, Minotto helped the emperor mobilize the local 
Venetian population in Constantinople for his war efforts. He convinced a number of 
merchant galleys and transports to remain in the city pending a siege, and acted as the 
emperor’s liaison in defense matters.
245
 Girolamo Minotto became so important to and 
trusted by Constantine XI that he was given command of the Greek and Italian troops 
defending the Blachernae Palace, the emperor’s imperial residence near the walls along 
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 As a result of his close relationship with Emperor Constantine and 
his animosity toward the Ottoman Turks, the Venetian baille Girolamo Minotto was one 
of Byzantium’s foremost advisors on diplomacy toward Venice and her citizens. 
However, Emperor Constantine’s diplomatic relations with Venice were 
complicated by his aggressive actions toward the republic while despot of the Morea. 
Specifically, Constantine’s capture of Patras, a port city in the Moreote northwest, 
irritated Venice and characterized the future emperor as a maverick. In the fifteenth 
century, the city of Patras was administered by its Latin archbishop, Pandolfo Malatesta, 
under the suzerainty of the Papacy.
247
 The Venetians briefly held possession of the city 
between 1408 and 1419, but sold the city to the Latin ruler of Epiros, Carlo II Tocco, who 
later placed the city under Rome’s protection. However, the Venetians still coveted Patras 
as a commercial center and conducted a brisk trade within the city. They also still viewed 
the city as a target for Venetian territorial expansion in the Morea, as Patras was located 
across the Corinthian Gulf from their base of Naupaktos. However, after John VIII 
established his brother Constantine in the northwest Morea as despot, the port city was a 
prime target for him as well. The despot did not waste time attacking the city. 
Constantine moved against Patras in 1428, shortly after his arrival in the Morea. 
However, even with the aid of his brothers John and Thomas, the despot could not 
capture the city. He accepted instead an annual tribute of 500 gold coins from the city’s 
defenders.
248
 While the Venetians in Naupaktos were not pleased with this arrangement 
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between Patras and Despot Constantine, it still allowed them to maintain their 
commercial ties to the city as before.  
Constantine’s subsequent actions surprised Venetian observers. Almost 
immediately, he laid siege to the city once again, this time with a larger, more committed 
army. The despot actively engaged the defenders, barely escaping death during a skirmish 
when archers killed his horse from under him.
249
 After a brief but intense struggle, the 
defenders and the despot reached an agreement, since the bishop was traveling through 
Italy during Constantine’s sieges of Patras. If he did not return after a month, the 
defenders would surrender to Constantine and proclaim him their overlord.
250
 When the 
metropolitan did not return in the allotted time, Patras surrendered to Despot Constantine, 
although the city’s citadel, defended by men loyal to the bishop (including some 
Venetians), did not surrender for another twelve months.
251
 Constantine’s occupation of 
Patras annoyed the Venetians and frustrated their plans for domination over the city.
252
 In 
addition, the Byzantine capture of Patras threatened the status of Venetian mercantile 
interests in the city, as the despot could force new taxes to finance his further Moreote 
campaigns.
253
 Despot Constantine’s actions against Patras would become important after 
his accession to the throne in 1449, as the military campaign established him as a 
maverick in Venetian eyes. Even twenty years later, the Republic of Venice viewed 
Constantine as a threat to their possessions in Greece and throughout the Levant, and was 
reluctant to provide him with aid. 
                                                
249
 Sphrantzes 36. 
250
 Sphrantzes 40: “If their lord and metropolitan returned during the month of May, he would act as he saw 
fit. If he failed to arrive, however, they would surrender the castle.” 
251
 Sphrantzes 45. 
252
 Nicol, The Immortal Emperor 11. 
253
 Peter Lock. The Franks in the Aegean 1204 – 1500 (New York: Longman, 1995) 108. 
 
85 
The Venetian government also hesitated to support Constantine XI in 
Constantinople because Byzantium possessed a sizeable debt to Venice. In 1449, shortly 
after Constantine’s accession, this debt amounted to 17,163 hyperpera, a staggering 
amount to the impoverished empire.
254
 Constantine himself accrued little of this debt. 
Much of it resulted from a loan taken by Anna of Savoy, mother of Emperor John V, 
during her civil wars with John VI Kantakouzenos in the late fourteenth century. Anna 
received 30,000 Venetian gold ducats for her campaigns, and offered the Byzantine 
crown jewels as collateral for future payment.
255
 Each successive emperor, including 
Constantine, felt indignation and embarrassment because the Byzantine crown jewels no 
longer resided in Constantinople. However, the emperors had more pressing concerns and 
uses for their monetary resources than recovering the crown jewels. Compounding this 
debt, in 1390 John VII agreed to pay a considerable amount of gold for damages to 
Venetian property in Constantinople during anti-Latin riots and collateral damages from 
the earlier civil wars.
256
 Constantine’s debt was further increased because of his elder 
brother Theodore’s actions. In 1424, while acting as despot of the Morea, Theodore 
attacked the Venetian ports of Modon and Coron, wreaking havoc with their possessions 
in the hinterland of those cities.
257
 Shortly thereafter, in the face of Venetian pressure, 
John VIII agreed to compensate Venice for their losses in the region. As a result of these 
actions throughout the late fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, Constantine XI and his 
court faced a staggering debt that the Venetians wanted to collect. 
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One of Constantine’s first acts as emperor was to stabilize his economic situation. 
With increased resources, he could continue to rebuild and repair the city walls, improve 
the city’s infrastructure, and begin to slowly pay Byzantium’s debts to the Venetians in 
order to gain their favor and assistance. Emperor Constantine’s administration did begin 
minting new hyperpera for such purposes, but the empire possessed a very limited 
amount of specie.
258
 In order to gain new sources of specie for his coinage, Constantine 
levied a new tax upon the foreign merchant interests in the city, extracting customs duties 
from their ships as they sailed to and from Constantinople in 1450.
259
 Almost 
immediately, the Venetians in the city railed against these new duties, claiming that they 
violated the Byzantine-Venetian treaty of 1448 signed by John VIII’s administration. 
This treaty guaranteed Venetian mercantile independence around the city.
260
 Constantine 
also received envoys from the Venetian government in Italy, complaining about the 
inconveniences suffered by Venice as a result of his sweeping tax measures.
261
 While the 
emperor desperately needed the revenues from these customs duties to finance 
Constantinople’s defense against the Ottoman Empire, he carefully considered the 
merchants’ opinions within the city. If Venice itself would not send support to 
Byzantium, the goodwill of Venetian merchants and captains residing in Constantinople 
would be crucial to its defense. Therefore, while he never withdrew the customs edict, its 
enforcement dropped significantly, especially as Turkish pressure on the city increased in 
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1452. As a result, Constantine could claim to the Venetian government that he was 
attempting to raise the monetary resources necessary to pay Byzantium’s considerable 
debt to the city, without alienating the sizeable Venetian population within 
Constantinople.  
 




In order to counter such negative perceptions, Constantine sought to ingratiate 
himself to Venetian interests by relying almost exclusively upon Venetian transportation 
throughout the Aegean. His decision to use Venetian shipping was not unique. Emperors 
throughout the fifteenth century relied upon Venice when traveling both around the 
Aegean and the Mediterranean. In 1400, Manuel II used their galleys during his grand 
visit to the rulers of Western Europe.
263
 Constantine’s brother John VIII also used 
Venetian transportation when traveling between Constantinople and Italy for the Council 
of Florence.
264
 This was partly a practical decision, since Venice held a powerful naval 
position in the region, with several strategic bases scattered on islands around the 
Mediterranean. The Venetians were also the only power that consistently defeated the 
Ottomans at sea. For example, a Venetian squadron smashed the Ottoman fleet off of 
Gallipoli in May 1416, causing significant damage to Turkish sailors’ morale.
265
 In fact, 
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these sailors became convinced of Venetian invulnerability at sea and were extremely 
wary of attacking them in the region. However, the Venetians were not the only group 
capable of transporting the Byzantines around the region. After 1261, the sea routes 
around Constantinople were essential to Genoese, Catalan, and other European trade 
interests centering on the port of Caffa on the Black Sea coast.
266
 Each of these powers 
maintained considerable trading fleets in the region, capable of shuttling the Greeks on 
their diplomatic and administrative missions. However, the Byzantine rulers tried to win 
the favor of local Venetian captains, giving them the nearly exclusive honor of 
transporting them on important missions of state. They also tried to impress the Venetian 
government by rarely traveling with their economic or political competitors such as the 
Genoese or other Italians. 
Constantine XI continued the traditions of his father and brother in this regard. 
During his tenure as despot, he often traveled between Constantinople and the Morea to 
receive instructions and guidance from his brother John VIII. In almost every 
documented case, Constantine traveled by way of Venetian galleys plying the trade 
routes between Crete, another Venetian possession, and ports along the Black Sea.
267
 He 
also used their ships to travel around the Morea, even negotiating with representatives of 
Patras aboard a Venetian merchant vessel in 1437.
268
 Upon his accession, Constantine’s 
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court almost exclusively used Venetian shipping while on missions of state. George 
Sphrantzes, the most prolific traveler in Constantine’s court, traveled on their ships 
during missions to the Morea, the Ottomans and to Trebizond.
269
 As a result of this 
exclusive usage, the Byzantine imperial family and court became familiar with several 
Venetian merchants and ships’ captains in the region. Many of these merchants and 
captains were among those that remained in Constantinople to help defend the city 
against the Ottoman Turks, showing that Constantine’s policy regarding Venetian 
transportation did succeed in drawing help for the empire. 
By maintaining friendly relationships with several of the Venetian captains who 
sailed around the Aegean and Black Seas, Emperor Constantine gained valuable 
intelligence concerning Ottoman military movements around Constantinople. The 
emperor regularly met with these friendly captains and received information about the 
Turks that the merchants would hear throughout their travels. For example, Venetian 
shipping alerted the emperor of Mehmed’s plans to build the fortress of Rumeli Hisar six 
miles away from the capital city. The captains also provided Constantine with detailed 
information concerning the armament and fortifications that the new castle possessed.
270
 
The emperor also wanted these captains to relay the information they gained through 
their travels to the Venetian government in order to convince it that the Byzantine capital 
was in extreme danger. Constantine XI Palaiologos rightly believed that the government 
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in Italy would believe its own sailors and captains concerning the Turkish threat, rather 
than any Greek envoy that the emperor might send to ask the Venetians for assistance. 
Since Emperor Constantine could not convince the Venetian government that 
their interests in Constantinople were threatened by an Ottoman invasion and that he was 
not a danger to their interests, Venice sent only a token amount of aid to Byzantium 
during the crisis. While the emperor’s plan to use Venetian merchant captains to convince 
the government of Constantinople’s precarious position did work, the main fleet intended 
to save the city did not arrive in time. The emperor himself could not sufficiently 
convince the Venetians that the city was really in any danger. The city’s fortifications had 
held off numerous Turkish assaults in the recent past, most notably in 1422, and the 
Venetian Senate believed that an attack by the young Mehmed II would also fail at the 
triple walls. Venetian naval victories against the Ottomans, most recently in 1416, also 
convinced Francesco Foscari and the senate that any Turkish navy posed little threat to 
Christians in the East.
271
 The Venetian government did answer a request by the emperor 
and the baille for provisions of body armor and gunpowder, which was sent ostensibly to 
defend Venetian interests in Constantinople from Turkish raids before the main siege 




The Venetian government did belatedly take some action to aid Byzantium. In 
late 1452, after impassioned pleas by Admiral Alvise Loredan, leader of the naval action 
off Gallipoli in 1416, and another merchant galley captain, Antonio Diedo, did the 
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Venetian Senate act to save Constantinople.
273
 The Venetian Senate begrudgingly voted 
to send an armada to the Aegean Sea to reinforce Constantinople when they heard news 
of Sultan Mehmed II’s preparations.
274
 However, this fleet was equipped so slowly that 
the Byzantines almost surely knew it would never come in time. Constantine continued to 
watch for any signs of a relieving Venetian fleet in the Aegean Sea throughout the siege, 
but it never arrived.
275
 As a result of the Venetian government’s lack of support for 
Constantinople, the emperor focused his attention upon the city’s Venetian residents as 
sources of support against the Ottoman invasion. 
While Constantine was only partially successful at convincing the Venetian 
government to aid Constantinople, he was very successful with the baille, Girolamo 
Minotto, and the rest of the Venetian residents of the city through his strategy of personal 
diplomacy. Since the government gave Minotto the power to act as he saw fit to protect 
the republic’s interests in Constantinople, whether by assisting the emperor or offering 
his friendship to the sultan, he wholeheartedly threw his support behind Constantine. 
Even though the emperor tried to impose new taxes upon the Venetian merchants, he 
eventually relented and had otherwise shown his friendship to them. In addition, many 
members of his court patronized Venetian interests and catered to their various needs in 
the city. Minotto knew that Constantine needed the Venetians and other Italian republics 
to carry out his trade and other mercantile affairs, and would therefore be amenable to 
their interests. On the other hand, Sultan Mehmed II did not need them. While contacts to 
lucrative trade markets in Italy did excite Turkish merchants, they were not crucial to the 
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 As a result, the baille took several measures to ensure the 
Venetian residents of Constantinople’s support against the Turks. 
Baille Girolamo Minotto, in cooperation with Emperor Constantine XI, prevented 
all Venetian ships from leaving Constantinople during the crisis. Since the city was an 
important waystation for ships traveling from Caffa and Trebizond, where they could rest 
and re-supply their vessels before sailing into the Aegean Sea, several merchant ships 
arrived throughout late 1452 and early 1453. These vessels were subsequently detained 
by the baille for military service.
277
 While such acts might have angered these merchants, 
who were now trapped in Constantinople as the city awaited Mehmed’s siege, there are 
no accounts of any such feelings in the Greek or Italian sources on the crisis. This can be 
attributed to both the baille’s and the emperor’s personal charisma, as they were able to 
inspire the city’s wary defenders on numerous occasions. However, the emperor still 
feared that the Venetians might abandon the city to its fate. The ships’ captains, as well as 
several other merchants who were defending the city, requested that their cargoes remain 
stored aboard Venetian vessels, instead of being stored in the city’s warehouses. This 
would significantly hasten any plan to abandon the emperor and Constantinople, since the 
Venetians would not have to waste time loading their ships before fleeing.
278
 However, in 
order to reassure the emperor, the baille forced each captain to swear an oath to 
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Constantine that he would not leave until the siege had ended.
279
 Nearly all of the 
Venetian captains honored their agreement with Minotto and Constantine XI, further 
showing the baille’s and the emperor’s skills of persuasion and inspiration. In all, at least 
nine Venetian vessels, with their crews, participated in the defense of Constantinople.
280
 
Aside from the ships’ crews, the other Venetian residents of Constantinople also 
actively defended the city for Emperor Constantine. Since they could no longer leave the 
city, as the baille had cancelled all departures from Constantinople, they also vigorously 
participated in the defense. The emperor made constant visits to the Venetian quarter of 
Constantinople, encouraging the residents and offering his thanks, making it known that 
their support was crucial for the city. Men from all professions joined work parties 
repairing the city’s fortifications, constructed shields and weapons in the Venetian 
quarter’s workshops, and took watches upon the city walls with the Greeks. For example, 
the surgeon Nicolò Barbaro details in his diary of the siege that the Venetian residents 
wholeheartedly supported the city’s defense, as he himself worked diligently to restore 
and augment the city’s fortifications.
281
 In fact, the Venetian residents of Constantinople 
were so proud of their involvement that when Constantine asked several contingents to 
parade along the city walls in their full regalia and armor, they gladly agreed.
282
 While 
the Venetian government sent only a small amount of aid to Constantinople during the 
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crisis and siege, the emperor successfully mobilized the local Venetian population to 
assist with the city’s defense. 
However, once the number of Venetians in the city swelled because several 
galleys and merchantmen remained for its defense, Constantine XI faced the potential 
problem of Italian rivalries erupting into violence. More specifically, the emperor needed 
to ease tensions between the Venetians and the population of Galata, the Genoese colony 
across the Golden Horn from Constantinople. The Genoese also participated in the 
defense of Constantinople. However, their contributions had to remain a secret in order to 
maintain the peace between the Ottomans and the Genoese government in Italy, and to 
safeguard their colony at Galata.
283
 Nonetheless, many Genoese crossed the Golden Horn 
to assist the emperor with the defense, sharing feelings of Christian camaraderie with the 
Greeks that superseded any treaty obligations. While initially the Venetians and Genoese 
maintained an uneasy peace in Constantinople, the arrival of Giovanni Giustiniani with 
seven hundred Genoese volunteers and mercenaries increased tensions between the two 
groups considerably. The emperor handled the situation very carefully. He recognized 
that Giustiniani, with his considerable experiences in siege warfare around Italy, would 
be the best commander for Constantinople’s triple walls.
284
 However, Constantine placed 
several Venetian contingents at key defense points along the walls to avoid showing 
favoritism toward the Genoese.
285
 By equally dividing the Venetians’ and Genoese’s 
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responsibilities during the Ottoman attack, Constantine avoided alienating either group in 
such a way that could compromise the city’s defense. 
 The emperor’s efforts in maintaining the peace between the two Italian factions 
were often tested once the Ottoman siege began in earnest in April 1453. There were 
several instances of the Venetians quarrelling with the Genoese over defense strategies, 
and these disputes often escalated into violence.
286
 One major incident occurred after the 
Christian forces attempted to destroy the Turkish vessels that had been dragged overland 
into the Golden Horn, behind the Greek and Italian defensive lines. After a short battle, 
the Ottomans completely defeated the Christian attack on their position, and sunk a 
Venetian war vessel, killing its crew. Following this failure, open fighting broke out 
between the Venetians and Genoese. The Venetians claimed that a Genoese spy informed 
the sultan and led to the loss of their vessel and crew.
287
 Once again, only the emperor’s 
personal charisma and leadership ability ended the violence, as he reminded the Italians 
that they could never survive if they remained divided.
288
 Constantine further tried to 
treat both sides equally to avoid resentment from either the Genoese or the Venetians and 
to forestall any further conflicts between them. For example, the emperor praises both 
sides equally in his final address to the troops on the eve of the fall.
289
 By continually 
communicating with both the Venetian and Genoese forces in Constantinople, reminding 
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them of their commitments to fight the Ottomans and quickly solving conflicts between 
them, Constantine successfully avoided alienating the Italians during the siege. The 
emperor effectively mobilized the Venetian residents in Constantinople for the Ottoman 
attack, retaining their services and loyalties while still making the most of the other 
Italian communities. The most notable of them were the Genoese who arrived in the 
capital to offer their services to the empire. 
 Emperor Constantine XI Palaiologos’ efforts to court the Venetians in 
Constantinople paid off as they fought the Ottomans with distinction, especially during 
the final assault on May 29, 1453. The Venetian citizen-soldiers fought in nearly every 
skirmish and major engagement during the month long siege of the city.
290
 Some 
Venetians, like the baille, Girolamo Minotto, fought until they were surrounded and 
captured by the Ottomans once they stormed the walls. Nearly all of the captured 
Venetians were executed by Sultan Mehmed II shortly after the city’s capture.
291
 Others, 
like Nicolò Barbaro, barely made it to the Christian vessels fleeing the Golden Horn once 
the battle had clearly been lost. It is a testament to Constantine’s diplomatic skills, as well 
as the personal relationships he and his court established among the Venetian community 
in Constantinople, that the Venetian residents fought as long and as hard as they did, 
instead of saving their own lives. While they did not possess the numbers to successfully 
defend Constantinople from the Ottomans, their devotion to the city was commendable. 
 Constantine XI’s diplomatic relations with the Venetians were a complete success 
on one level, but failed in other aspects. The emperor and his court cultivated a close 
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relationship with local Venetian interests, especially with the merchants and ship captains 
that traveled around the Aegean and Black Seas. In addition, Constantine developed a 
friendly rapport with the Venetian baille of Constantinople, Girolamo Minotto. As a 
result, the local Venetian population was ready to assist the emperor with the city’s 
defense against the Ottomans, and many of them gave their lives in the struggle. This was 
a major diplomatic success for the emperor. Instead of packing their belongings and 
leaving the city for safer Venetian bases in the Aegean, the residents of Constantinople 
chose to remain and fight. On the other hand, Constantine XI Palaiologos’ diplomatic 
overtures to the Venetian government in Italy were largely unsuccessful. Since his 
administration did not trust the Venetian doge, they did not believe it was useful to 
aggressively court the republic because it would almost surely refuse to aid Byzantium. 
Therefore, the emperor did little to counter the Venetian Senate’s opinion that he was a 
maverick and as much a danger to Venetian possessions in the Levant as the Ottoman 
Turks. Eventually Venetians familiar with the emperor pleaded with the senate on 
Byzantium’s behalf, but a relief force was not equipped in time to save the Byzantine 
capital. As a result, Constantine XI’s relations with Venice and the Venetian population 
of Constantinople show that his diplomatic strategies focused primarily upon courting 
individuals, such as Girolamo Minotto and several ships captains in the Levant, in order 









Each of these previous examples shows the importance of Emperor Constantine 
XI Palaiologos’ personal relationships in both Byzantine diplomatic relations and foreign 
policy creation during the empire’s final years. Instead of relying upon an extensive 
bureaucracy, as Byzantine emperors of previous centuries had, Constantine relied upon 
his charisma and commanding presence. He tried to create personal connections with 
influential foreigners, mainly Italians, to accomplish his diplomatic goals and create 
foreign policy. He was not always successful, as his relations with the Ottomans portray. 
He could not prevent the fall of Constantinople to the Turks on May 29, 1453, since 
Sultan Mehmed II was determined to take the city soon after his accession. The 
emperor’s diplomatic efforts and foreign policy toward the Ottomans were largely 
ineffective, because Constantine did not develop close relations with any Ottoman elites 
during his life. However, the emperor secured resources from Rome and the Venetians 
that considerably delayed the city’s capitulation because of his relations with Italian 
elites, carefully cultivated throughout Constantine’s travels around the Aegean. 
Constantine XI and his court could not gain reliable diplomatic information 
regarding the Ottoman Turks, nor create a consistent foreign policy toward the empire 
because they did not develop a deep relationship with any members of the Ottoman elite, 
particularly Grand Vizier Candarli Halil Pasha. While the Greeks aggressively attempted 
to court him to their cause, especially to exert his influence over Ottoman policies toward 
Byzantium, Halil Pasha remained loyal to the sultan, following his wishes and assisting 
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in the conquest of Constantinople. As a result, the Byzantine administration could not 
formulate an effective foreign policy toward the Ottoman Empire. Instead, the Greeks 
alternated between acts of hostility and supplication to the Turks. In fact, the only 
consistent Byzantine action against the Ottoman threat during Constantine XI’s reign was 
the refortification of Constantinople. These inconsistencies antagonized the Turks and 
exacerbated the tensions between the two groups, and did not alter Sultan Mehmed II’s 
ultimate plan to conquer the Byzantine capital. The Ottoman case portrays the 
shortcomings of Constantine XI’s and his court’s use of personal diplomacy to save the 
empire during its final years. 
The Byzantine use of this tactic for diplomatic overtures and foreign policy 
creation did succeed with other powers. Constantine XI Palaiologos’ relations with Rome 
improved considerably through his relationship with the papal legate to Constantinople, 
Cardinal Isidore. The emperor and his councilors possessed the political skill necessary to 
realize that celebrating an imperial coronation in the capital upon his accession, with 
unionist clergy, would exacerbate the religious tensions within the city. However, 
Constantine and his advisors needed the expertise of someone familiar with papal 
expectations of the Greeks in the implementation of church union, in order to gain 
military aid for Constantinople. Since the Greek cardinals, especially Isidore, understood 
the difficulties facing the imperial administration in the city, particularly the rising anti-
unionist sentiments, they advised the emperor on the best way to implement union, and 
gain the Papacy’s military support, while avoiding conflict within Constantinople. Even 
though the pope did not send enough soldiers to prevent the city’s fall, the resources his 
ships provided prevented its early capitulation to the Turks. As a result, Emperor 
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Constantine XI used personal diplomacy, shown through his relationship with Cardinal 
Isidore, to secure crucial support for the empire during its final crisis. 
The Venetian case also highlights the success of personal diplomacy for the 
Byzantines. However, Constantine’s diplomatic overtures and foreign policy were 
received differently by two distinct groups of Venetians. The Venetian citizens of 
Constantinople responded favorably to Byzantine diplomatic efforts designed to gain 
their support for the city’s defense, because their baille, Girolamo Minotto, advised 
Constantine of how to properly approach them while at the imperial court. For example, 
many of the major construction projects in Constantinople during Constantine XI’s reign, 
besides the continual restoration of the defenses, catered to Venetian interests in the city. 
However, the Venetian government in Italy responded to these overtures less 
enthusiastically, because they were specifically designed to court the Venetians in 
Constantinople. Even so, Constantine’s relations with Venetian merchants and ship 
captains aided his requests for aid from the republic. They were instrumental in finally 
convincing the senate that defending the Byzantine Empire was in their best interest, and 
at least partially mobilizing the republic’s resources to assist the Greeks. Venice sent the 
Byzantines provisions to Constantinople, and began outfitting a fleet to come to its 
defense shortly before the city fell to the Turks. As a result of the imperial 
administration’s efforts, the Venetian citizens in Constantinople, as well as several 
Venetian merchant vessels, actively participated in its defense instead of fleeing to safer 
locations. The Byzantines’ use of personal diplomacy toward the Venetians can also be 
viewed as a success despite the fall of Constantinople because the administration created 
coherent, effective policies that encouraged them to provide aid for the city. 
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Even though the Byzantine Empire did not possess its former prestige or power 
during the fifteenth century, Emperor Constantine XI Palaiologos effectively used the 
resources available to him in his attempt to save Constantinople. Personal diplomacy was 
ineffective against the Ottomans, since the Turkish elites did not reside in the imperial 
capital and Turkish residents were mainly transients. As a result, the imperial 
administration could not present an effective foreign policy toward them, and they 
continued their plans for the conquest of Constantinople. While he was ultimately 
unsuccessful in his task of dissuading the Ottomans from attacking, the number of 
Italians present during the siege is a testament to the emperor’s efforts in the face of such 
hardships. The death of many of these same Italians, during and following the final battle, 
also shows his impact upon them, as he inspired them by example. He refused to flee 
Constantinople for the relative safety of the Byzantine Morea, engaging the Turks in 
hand-to-hand fighting until he was killed. Even during the darkest period of Byzantine 
diplomacy, when the empire faced its final challenge, Emperor Constantine XI 
Palaiologos used his particular talents to gain western aid. 
Even though the Byzantine Empire fell in the morning hours of Tuesday, May 29, 
1453 and the emperor was killed, Constantine XI’s diplomatic and foreign relations are 
important for study. First, these processes are useful for comparative reasons. While the 
diplomatic endeavors during the height of Byzantine power have been thoroughly 
studied, those of the empire’s final years have not received such attention. With a detailed 
study of foreign policy creation under Constantine XI, changes over time can be 
examined. In addition, a discussion of Byzantine relations toward other powers during the 
empire’s last years proves that the Greeks did not merely react to the actions of those 
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around them, particularly the Ottomans. Previous works detailing the end of Byzantium 
portray the Greeks as powerless to influence the events unfolding around them. This is 
not the case. Despite their relative weakness, the Byzantines creatively used the resources 
at their disposal, particularly through personal diplomacy, to actively seek salvation for 
the empire. For these reasons, the study of Constantine XI’s diplomatic and foreign 
relations is important for Byzantine historical scholarship. 
It is also necessary to recognize Emperor Constantine XI’s personal growth and 
fortitude during this dire period. While a competent administrator and capable warrior 
since he was a young man, Constantine gained a deeper understanding of the threat that 
the Ottomans posed to the empire’s survival throughout his life. As the years passed and 
his experience grew, he clearly recognized and appreciated that Byzantium was facing its 
greatest crisis. Salvation appeared to be out of the empire’s grasp. However, this did not 
deter the emperor from actively seeking aid, which he eventually received from several 
sources. Lesser Byzantine emperors fled from their problems. Constantine faced his until 
the bitter end: Surrounded by Turks while fighting at the ruined city walls, he died 
defending his empire. While his victories were few, Constantine XI Palaiologos’ efforts 
continued the fine tradition of Byzantine diplomacy and foreign relations despite 
considerable hardships. His resolve and skill in the face of such adversity make him, and 
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